Showing posts with label Mohammed Sidique Khan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mohammed Sidique Khan. Show all posts

Tuesday, 12 July 2011

Murdoch phone hacking and 7/7 Investigation

From: "J7: The July 7th Truth Campaign"
To: homeaffcom@parliament.uk
Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2011

To the members of the Home Affairs Select Committee

The revelations of phone hacking by News International calls into question the role of the police and the Murdoch press during the investigation into the London Bombings on July 7th 2005.

A Times report written by Daniel McGrory and dated 25/08/2005:
The youngest of the July 7 bombers, he made three desperate telephone calls begging for help from the other members of the terror cell minutes before he blew himself up on a London bus.

The frantic last messages are seen by Scotland Yard as vivid proof that the British-born Muslim extremists intended to die in the attacks.

Knowing that all four men were supposed to synchronise the timing of the explosions, Hussain ran out of King’s Cross Underground station and tried to reach his accomplices by mobile telephone.

It was just before 9am, but by then all his fellow bombers were already dead. The other three had triggered their devices within seconds of one another at 8.50am.

Hussain is believed to have first called Mohammad Sidique Khan, 30, the alleged leader of the group, saying: “I can’t get on a train. What should I do ?” Then in quick succession he left the same message for Shehzad Tanweer and Jermaine Lindsay as, clearly agitated about his next move, he hurried away from the station.

A police source who has heard the telephone calls said: “His voice was getting more and more frantic with each call.” Investigators could tell from his breathless voice that Hussain was walking fast as he made these calls.

These messages were not played nor even were they claimed to exist during the recent 7/7 Inquests.

We need to know:

Did the Times hack the phone messages of the 4 accused of 7/7?

Who was the ‘police source’ who gave this information to the Times?

Why did the 7/7 Inquests not have an opportunity to hear these messages?

Why did the 7/7 Inquests not refer to these messages?

Regards

J7: the July 7th Truth Campaign

Thursday, 7 July 2011

6th Anniversary of 7/7

On the 6th anniversary of 7/7, J7 are once again forced to reiterate our demand for a fully Independent Public Inquiry held outside of the constraints of the Inquiries Act 2005.

At the conclusion of the 7/7 Inquests, Lady Justice Hallett named the 4 accused, Khan, Tanweer, Hussain and Lindsay as the perpetrators of the events of 7/7, despite the clear legal constraints that apply to Coroners and their ability to apportion guilt. Hallett concluded the inquest proceedings by refusing to resume the Inquests into the deaths of the 4. As part of our efforts to get to the truth of 7/7, J7 submitted a clear, detailed and reasoned submission to the inquests outlining why the resumption of these Inquests was imperative. J7's submission for resumption can be read here

As we stated in our submission:
  • The lack of representation of the families of the 4 men allowed any and all of the evidence presented to go unchallenged, meaning no witnesses called to the inquests were cross examined on behalf of the families of the accused.
  • The Inquests sat without a jury.
  • The Metropolitan Police investigation, Operation Theseus, was deemed to be outside the scope of the Inquests and thus the entire investigation behind Ian Blair's "largest criminal inquiry in English history" remains unexamined and unquestioned.
  • The Inquests for the 4 accused, in which a verdict of suicide would require a criminal standard of proof, were not resumed.
There are many glaring holes in the evidence that was presented to the Inquests, as detailed on the J7: 7/7 Inquests Blog which we set-up specially to report on the inquests, yet these potential showstoppers for the official narrative of events went unreported in the mainstream media. The absolute pressing necessity for a fully independent Public Inquiry is now greater than ever in order to enable anyone to have any confidence in the evidence by which the guilt or innocence of the four accused might be established. To date there has been no proper legal scrutiny of this evidence. Furthermore, in cases of alleged suicide, the intent to commit suicide must be proven and this burden of proof has not yet been met.

Without a full Public Inquiry, it remains the case that:
  • The bodies of Tanweer and Khan were not included in the 'Life Extinct' body counts carried out on 7th July by Dr Morgan Costello.
  • The police viewing of the Luton Station CCTV footage was conducted as early as 10th July, despite the official account clearly stating that the men were identified on CCTV at King's Cross Thameslink on 11th July, and that it was this discovery that led the investigation to Luton as a possible site of interest.
  • There exist no sightings of three of the men, Khan Tanweer and Lindsay, after the footage from King's Cross Thameslink, some way from the Underground tube network. Apparently the temporary CCTV system that was installed at King's Cross underground malfunctioned for the 20 crucial minutes between 8.30 and 8.50. Additionally, there are no recordings of the three from any other cameras. This means that there is absolutely no CCTV evidence that shows three of the accused anywhere on the London Underground network on the morning of 7 July 2005.
  • No CCTV from the pre-explosion tube carriages has been released, despite this CCTV apparently existing, and despite it being crucial evidence which could confirm or deny that three of the men boarded the carrriages they are alleged to have boarded. This CCTV should also have been made available to Colonel Mahoney when the expensive modelling of likely injuries sustained by the deceased was conducted to make up for the lack of any internal post mortems on the victims.
  • No CCTV exists from McDonald's showing whether Hussain actually used the premises to insert a new 9v battery into his apparently malfunctioning bomb, as it was revealed during the inquests that the store manager can be seen on CCTV (oh the irony) turning off the CCTV system before Hussain entered.
  • No CCTV exists of Hasib Hussain on either of the buses he is alleged to have boarded. There is no footage of Hussain aboard the number 91 bus, nor the number 30 bus he is alleged to have destroyed, nor is there any street or traffic camera footage showing him boarding either bus.
  • There is a huge discrepancy between the explosives allegedly used, as given in sworn evidence to the Jean Charles de Menezes Inquest, and the evidence that Clifford Todd gave to the 7/7 Inquests.
  • There is strong evidence in the public domain to suggest that at the heart of the story behind 7/7 lay at least three operatives for both the British and American Intelligence services, one of which served an insanely short period in a US prison, for greater crimes than those his testimony put behind bars for far longer terms, before being quietly released.
These questions and many more can be found on the 7/7 Inquests blog.

Six years on from an event with the largest single loss of life in London since the blitz can the Metropolitan Police, with it's long track record of complicity in facilitating Miscarriages of Justice -- and given the recent revelations that it is implicated in the Murdoch News of the World phone hacking scandal -- be allowed to offer a 'narrative' which is so deeply flawed and suspect? How about a 'narrative' which has remained unexamined and unchallenged except by J7? A 'narrative' that has ascribed guilt to four men without their families having the opportunity and legal representation to question, particularly when the four accused have been denied their own Inquest proceedings? Or a 'narrative' deemed outside the scope of inquiry by the 7/7 Inquests, and a 'narrative' which has led to the demonisation of the Muslim population? This is the same flawed and unproven narrative that has been the basis for the questioning of multi-culturalism and a 'narrative' which has done much to fuel the race-hate and bigotry of the far-right neo-fascist organisation, the EDL.

Current Prime Minister, David Cameron, has announced not one but two inquiries into the ongoing criminal exploits and activities of the press and police, just as news was breaking that the families of 7/7 victims were also victims of phone hacking at the hands of Murdoch media. This means that, as if we woke to find outselves in the midst of a Kafka novel, it is apparently right and proper to investigate whether or not the families of 7/7 victims had their mobile phones hacked, but it is not right and proper to have a full, in-depth, independent public investigation into how those same families of the 7/7 victims lost their loved ones.

J7: The July 7th Truth Campaign continue to say NO! This will not stand! Only a fully Independent Public Inquiry held outside of the constraints of the Inquiries Act 2005 has the vaguest chance of getting to the truth behind the 'narrative' of 7/7.

J7 will be writing again in the near future to ask for your continued support in our joint campaign for the truth about 7/7, and we will provide a few suggestions for ways you can help us pressure the government into commissioning an independent public inquiry.

For truth and justice,
J7: The July 7th Truth Campaign

Wednesday, 15 June 2011

A Nissan Micra Tardis?

The official narrative would have us believe that three of the 7/7 accused, Khan, Tanweer and Hussain, left Leeds in the early hours of the morning of 7th July 2005 after visiting 18 Alexandra Grove (the apparent 'bomb factory') and loading a rented Nissan Micra with home-made explosives of the type shown here:

The quantity of 'bulk explosives' claimed to have been found at 18 Alexandra Grove

According to the testimony of senior forensic investigator, Clifford Todd, only one of these substances was shown to be potentially viable as an explosive.
Q. Were there different types of sludge at the address?
A. Yes, there were two types. One was much darker than the other. One was a fairly light, sandy, yellow-brown colour. The other type was a much darker brown colour.
Q. Was there a difference between them, their effects?
A. Yes. The darker brown material, after various tests done at the laboratory, was found not to be energetic, so would not work as an explosive. The lighter, sandy-coloured material, that was shown, in at least one specific case, to be a high explosive.
That none of these containers could be forensically linked by either DNA or fingerprints to any of the four accused is an area which received no scrutiny or examination when DC Reynolds, of SO15 Counter-terrorism Command forensic management team, gave his testimony. Hussain's fingerprints were apparently found on only one plastic container which it was claimed contained HMTD. [1/02/2011 p13 13-15]

So, after collecting approx 40Kg of a light brown sludge that in "at least one specific case" could potentially possess explosive properties, the three men drove off in the rented Nissan Micra. Of note is that any less than "at least one specific case" would in fact mean that the sludge was potentially explosive in exactly "no specific case".

Despite much discussion of counter-surveillance methods by the use of 'operational phones' solely for use between the four accused, Shehzad Tanweer appears to have been quite content to give his 'operational phone' number on the rental agreement for the hired Micra. We know this because it is claimed that the car hire company called this phone on 7th July at 14.58, although, perhaps a little strangely, this was before the end of the rental period and we can only wonder what might have prompted this contact. This point was also contradicted by the statements from the car hire company read to the Inquests on 14/10/2010. [See pages 44 & 47]



A Nissan Micra is a very small car with a very limited boot capacity - yet it contained three men, two cool boxes, 40Kg of bulk explosives, five large rucksacks and a variety of other items, as shown in the picture below:


The items that were forensically linked to Khan, we are told, did not include the rucksack left behind in the Micra, nor the cool boxes which presumably contained the explosive substance, but  were  instead innocuous everyday items to which everyone can be forensically linked at a moment's notice: carrier bags, biros, sweet wrappers, etc.

According to the read statement of Sarah Lancaster, a Senior Case Officer in the Forensic Explosives Laboratory, also contained within the Micra must have been freezer ice blocks:
Based on my observations at the scene, my subsequent examination of the items submitted to this laboratory and in conjunction with the police photographs provided, it is my opinion that the damage in and around carriage 6713 of the Circle Line Underground train was consistent with a detonation of several kilograms, probably in the order of 10 kilograms, of a high explosive substance. [2/02/11 p46:6]

... exhibits which were reassembled to demonstrate that they were part of the freezer ice blocks and packs wrapped around the bomb. She concluded: "The use of freezer ice blocks and packs primarily suggests that it was necessary to keep a component of the IED cool. [ibid p50:15]



No explanation is given for the contents of the black bags in the right hand cool box - what did they contain?

After arriving at Luton station car park, and parking next to Lindsay's Fiat Brava, we presume that the men stood at the boot of the Micra and assembled their explosive devices - if they were already packed, primed and ready to go inside the rucksacks there would have been little need for the ice packs inside the cool boxes. It is also hard to see where five rucksacks already packed with explosives would have fitted into the Micra along with the three men as the boot was already full with the cool boxes.

Would any serious 'terrorists' with murder on their minds choose to park at a busy commuter station next to a pay and display machine and adjacent to an exit from the car park - in the position that the two blue cars can be seen in the image below - during the early morning rush hour if they were intending to construct these devices, packing them with ice packs and inserting initiating devices of wires, light bulbs and batteries? Standing at a boot of a car at a busy commuter station on the outskirts of London during one of its busiest times, in broad daylight, all watched over by CCTV machines of convenient fail?

Luton Station car park showing the area where the Brava and Micra parked

Is it even vaguely credible that the scenario described above is actually what really happened on the morning of the 7th July 2005?

Really?

Monday, 21 March 2011

J7 Submission for Resumption of Inquests into the four

Following an order by Lady Justice Hallett requesting representations regarding the resumption of inquests into the deaths of the four, subsequent to the conclusion of the hearings in relation to the inquests of the 52 deceased, J7 issued the following.

Note: Footnotes in the original document have been converted to direct links.

J7: The July 7th Truth Campaign
Submission for Resumption

Further to Lady Justice Hallett's order dated 11th March 2011, which reads as follows:

IN THE INNER WEST LONDON (WESTMINSTER) CORONER’S COURT CORONER’S INQUESTS INTO THE LONDON BOMBINGS OF 7 JULY 2005
_____________________________________________
ORDER
_____________________________________________
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Any person wishing to make representations to the Coroner as to whether or not any or all of the inquests into the deaths of Mohammed Siddique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer, Jermaine Lindsay and Hasib Hussain should be resumed must notify the Solicitor to the Inquests in written submissions by 4.00 p.m. on Friday 18th March 2011.

2. Any such written submissions must identify in full the grounds on which the person on whose behalf they are filed claims to have an interest in the relevant inquest(s) and the grounds upon which it is said the inquests must be resumed.
With regard to the issue of the legality of not resuming the Inquests into the deaths of the four accused, we submit that the legal right to an Inquest where no Inquiry is held overrides all other considerations:
The right to an inquest

An inquest must be held in those circumstances where a Coroner is informed that the body of a person is lying within his or her district and there is reasonable cause to suspect that the individual died:

A violent or unnatural death or
A sudden death of which the cause is unknown or.
In prison or in such circumstances as to require an inquest under any other Act.

The Coroner only has a right to hold an inquest if one of these conditions is satisfied. Conversely, the Coroner cannot decide not to hold an inquest if one of the conditions is satisfied.
The pressing need to resume the inquests into the four accused is further compounded by the magnitude and significance of the circumstances in which it is alleged the deaths occurred.

The Inquests into the 52 cannot stand instead of, nor can they be considered as a substitute for, Inquests into the deaths of the four accused; as stated by Hugo Keith QC on many occasions these proceedings omitted the relevant facts:
6 My Lady, in the light of the fact that these
7 inquests are not concerned with Hussain, I have no need
8 to read out the cause of death, but it is obvious.
23 … We're not, of course, concerned with
24 their inquests and so I needn't read out the full detail
We respectfully suggest that a jury be empanelled at the resumed Inquests and that all the circumstances surrounding these deaths be thoroughly examined and explored.

If full arguments are deemed necessary by the Deputy Coroner, then J7 submit the following in favour of resumption of the Inquests into the deaths of Mohammed Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer, Jermaine Lindsay and Hasib Hussain

J7 Interest in the Inquests

J7: The July 7th Truth Campaign is comprised of ordinary members of the public concerned that a fully independent public inquiry, particularly one held outside of the constraints of the Inquiries Act 2005, was refused twice by the government. Over 3,400 people have signed the J7 petition calling on the government to release the evidence they claim to have in support of the story outlined in the meagre 'Report of the official account of the bombings in London on 7th July 2005'.

Our tireless campaigning and research over the last five years, much of which has involved doggedly pursuing responses to Freedom of Information requests, has led to the accumulation of a vast body of knowledge regarding the events of 7th July 2005, contained on our People's Investigation Forum. Our analysis is published on our main web site at: http://julyseventh.co.uk, much of which had been further compiled in order to produce our Submissions to the Inquests. Further, our work was repeatedly, albeit indirectly, referenced throughout the course of proceedings, with the Inquests' own council choosing to mention our 'voluminous' submission as part of his opening statement.

The inquest proceedings transcripts have made reference to J7 as 'a group following the proceedings closely', so our interest in the events of 7 July 2005 and our continued work in this area are well known by all involved and, we submit, part of the grounds on which we should be considered a Properly Interested Party. Our initial submissions certainly provided the basis for some of the lines of enquiry for the inquests of the 52, even if these lines of enquiry were not duly explored.

Concerned at the absence of a jury at the resumed Inquests into the 52 deaths, J7 undertook the role of carefully watching these proceedings and examining the evidence released throughout. J7 wrote to the Deputy Coroner with many of the issues that arose during proceedings and on occasion, questions posed by J7 were put to witnesses. Many of the outstanding questions that arose are documented on the J7: 7/7 Inquests blog.

Despite a mass of evidence adduced before the Inquests into the deaths of 52 people on 7th July 2005, J7 are concerned at the refusal by the Legal Services Commission to grant legal aid for representation at the Inquests to any of the families of the four accused, thus preventing them from making submissions. J7 wrote to the Coroner expressing these concerns in an email dated 25th April 2010:
Our concern is that it has recently been announced that two of the families of the accused men are to be refused legal aid to be represented at the Inquests. Given the immensity of the crimes alleged against them, and the history of miscarriages of justice in the British courts when 'fighting terrorism', as happened in the cases of the Guildford 4, Birmingham 6 etc, we believe that the families of the accused must be given access to justice and representation at the forthcoming Inquest. Without this, British justice remains skewed in favour of the State and will only lead people, especially Muslims, to question whether justice is available to them.
Legal aid at Inquests can be granted in exceptional cases if "there is a wider public interest or it aids the coroner’s investigations". It is most certainly in the wider public interest that legal aid is granted in this case, and we are hopeful that you can, as the coroner, request that the Ministry of Justice review their decision in this matter. We understand that an inquest verdict of suicide requires a criminal standard of proof. Representation of the families would be of great assistance to the inquest's task of determining whether such a verdict is justified.
The arguments for the families of the four to be represented at the Inquests and for resumption are set out in the judicial review dated 27th August 2010 which include the following relevant and important points:
21. On 23 April 2010 the claimant’s solicitor wrote to Mr Martin Smith, Solicitor to the Inquests, to inform him that, “had there been funding”, counsel would have made submissions to the effect that:

(1) the Inquests should be resumed;
(2) the Inquests should be joined; and
(3) his clients should be made Interested Persons in the Inquests of some of the deceased.
And at point 24:
"i) Effective participation would enable them to discharge their right to put questions and explore issues as an interested party. Additionally their participation may help other parties to explore issues thereby having the potential to produce real benefits for the other Interested Parties;
ii) The proceedings are on any view ‘significant’;
iii) Well-documented campaign to establish the full extent of the knowledge of the security services;
iv) [The claimant] is in a ‘unique position’ as the wife of the alleged ring-leader and her association with the other perpetrators and others. It is difficult to envisage other individuals who could assist the inquest to the same extent;
v) [The claimant] equally anxious to explore the true extent of the knowledge of the Security Services;
vi) Analysis of the intelligence failings may reveal that the atrocity was entirely preventable and the lives of the victims and perpetrators may have been saved;
vii) Volume of material. Extraordinary and unreasonable to expect [the claimant] to deal with by way of legal help; and
viii) No legitimate distinction between those granted funding and [the claimant]"
The families of the 52 expressed their objections to the Inquests to be joined and with regard to the families of the four accused having representation. Although this was their right, the families of the four men also have rights as bereaved family members; these same rights apply equally to the public – and especially the Muslim community, who bear the brunt of anti-terror legislation – to examine the evidence that would need to be presented to the inquests proceedings. This was denied them by the withholding of legal aid for representation – a very blunt and unsubtle tool by which to suppress the right of the families of the accused to legal representation at the Inquests into the 52.

We submit that the arguments forwarded by the families at the judicial review still hold true and that by granting them PIP status at resumed Inquests into the deaths of their loved ones could trigger legal aid being granted by the Legal Services Commission. After all, many public bodies used public funds for representation at these Inquests, the London Fire Brigade, West Yorkshire Police, Metropolitan Police Service, etc. all of whom are funded from the public purse. The public interest argument for these Inquests to be resumed would also be addressed by granting PIP to the families of the four.

It is the lack of challenge or questions that J7 are concerned with and so we ask to be also considered as PIPs in these proceedings, with this submission and our previous works and researches as the justifications for so qualifying. J7 have contacted the office of the Official Solicitor on the basis that, if there is to be no submission for resumption because legal aid has not been made available to any of the families of the four, and nor has PIP status been granted to them, then the State has a duty to represent the interests of Justice by ensuring these Inquests are resumed, and the evidence adduced and questioned accordingly.

Grounds upon which the Inquests must be resumed

(1) As detailed above, J7 are most concerned that the Catch 22 situation of refusing legal aid to allow submissions for resumption of the Inquests into the 4 deaths is being used to prevent the families from asking questions or, potentially even challenging the evidence adduced. This is both unfair and unjust. Justice in this case not only needs to be seen to be done, it must in fact be done.

(2) To date, there have been no proceedings at which the full 'Operation Theseus' evidence has been examined or challenged. The two trials at which this evidence was first submitted for public scrutiny was unable to question or challenge the evidence, the motivation, or the means and methods of the four men, as the accused had no knowledge of these events. Further, and most significantly given the degree with which the State pursued prosecutions against them, Waheed Ali, Sadeer Saleem, and Mohammed Shakil, they were found not guilty, on both separate occasions that the State endeavoured to prosecute them, of all charges connected to the Operation Theseus investigation. Therefore the evidence did not come under the detailed scrutiny required in a criminal trial, as it would have had the alleged perpetrators lived. (q.v. Guildford 4, Birmingham 6, Maguire 7, Danny McNamee, etc.)

(3) We understand and would like to highlight and reiterate that an inquest verdict of suicide requires a criminal standard of proof with regard to establishing definite intent to commit suicide. The representation of the families will be of great assistance to the Inquest's task of determining whether such a verdict is justified. Without a resumption of the Inquests into the four, this finding cannot be legally made.

(4) We understand that the four cannot be named as the perpetrators of the 52 deaths in any narrative verdict available to the Deputy Coroner in these proceedings.

(5) J7 argue that the evidence for the Theseus investigation was considered outside of the scope of these proceedings, yet evidence adduced during these proceedings has shown cause for concern over the accuracy of this evidence. One instance, for example, occurred on 2nd February 2011, while DS Stuart was under questioning from Ms Gallagher QC:
Q. Detective Sergeant, just to clarify it, if we could go back to [INQ105680-12] at paragraph 64 , when, in the opening to the Theseus trial, as was widely reported, it stated there that this information was recovered from that mobile phone found at Edgware Road, is that simply wrong?
A. Yes.
(6) The identification of 'Conspiracy Theories' as one of the raison d'etres for the resumption of the Inquests into the 52 was stated by Hugo Keith QC in his opening statement on 14th October 2011:
12 ….. Thus it is
13 to be hoped that these inquests, however unpleasant and
14 distressing, as they will be, will assist in answering
15 the families' questions in allaying some of the rumours
16 and suspicion generated by conspiracy theorists.
17 I'll return a little later to the question of
18 whether there is, in truth, any basis for some of the
19 theories that have been canvassed in the press and on
20 the internet.
Whilst J7 would take issue with the apparent pejorative use of the term 'conspiracy theorists' given the multiplicity of well documented anomalies, inconsistencies and falsehoods contained in the official narrative (as outlined in our detailed submissions to the Inquests) and the questions that have subsequently arisen from Inquest evidence and testimony, and given the fact that it is, as a point of fact, the State itself that most frequently uses and abuses the charge of 'Conspiracy' in its prosecutions, we are aware that, without resumption of the Inquests into the four, the many further questions regarding the evidence that have arisen during the Inquest proceedings will continue to remain unanswered.
Some of these questions are detailed below:

(i) The Inquests have already heard that a report into the bombings by the parliamentary intelligence and security committee, the only public body to which the security service reports, contained "many many mistakes and inaccuracies" in its account of the intelligence service's conduct before the attacks.

(ii) There is the significant issue of the requirement to prove intent to commit suicide in cases where suicide is suspected. In cases of suspected suicides inquests will be held, but the victim's intention to commit suicide must be definitely proven; here-in lies the burden of proof. In the absence of any clear proof of intent, the verdict is unlikely to be suicide, but rather 'death by misadventure', 'accidental death', or there will be an 'open' verdict. There are in existence two alleged “martyrdom videos”; one of which appears to show Khan and the release of which called an end to all lines of questioning of the official story that were being pursued by the media, and the second, cunningly released on the first anniversary of the 7/7 attacks, appears to show Tanweer. It is worth noting that throughout the contrived and stilted rhetoric in each video, no mention is made by either Khan or Tanweer regarding any intention to commit suicide. Further, there is no mention in either video of any attacks on London, or London's transport infrastructure. Indeed there are no references to the launching of any attacks at all, suicide or otherwise. There has also been no mention at all of Tanweer, Hussain or Lindsay leaving last wills and testaments, despite this being a requirement in Islam. This leaves all four suspected suicides for which the burden of proof of intent to commit suicide has not yet been addressed in anything other than loosely circumstantial way, much less has that standard of proof been met.

(iii) Testimony given by DI Kindness on 14th October 2010 calls into question, once again, aspects of the government narrative and further errors in Theseus evidence:
MS GALLAGHER: You say that you focused upon Luton station as a result of information received on 11 July. Is that right?
A. That's correct, yes.
Q. In that document which I've made reference to, I think you have it before you, my Lady, the Anti-terrorist Branch SO13 record -- do you have that document before you?
A. No, I don't, no.
Q. Is it possible for a copy to be provided?
MR KEITH: You can have my copy. (Handed)
MS GALLAGHER: This is a record of an officer viewing CCTV. It seems to be by a DC Stephen Bain. Was he part of the same team?
A. Yes, he was, yes.
Q. If you just look in the box at the top, it's on the left, five boxes down, "Date viewing commenced: 10 July 2005, 20.00 hours" and "Date viewing ended:11 July 2005, 23.30".
A. Yes.
Q. So is it possible that, in fact, that information was received on 10 July rather than 11 July, Inspector?
A. That's absolutely correct. It's an error. It should have been the 10th.
This evidence was further contradicted by DCS McKenna on the closing day of evidence when he stated:
1 You've already outlined, I think, most of the main
2 threads of investigation that led to us Luton railway
3 station and it's -- it was a fortuitous coincidence
4 that, on the day that we had discovered the CCTV from
5 Luton railway station, we, of course, were assisted by
6 the coming forward of some witnesses from Luton, from
7 whom you have heard, who raised with us the suspicious
8 activity they'd seen in relation to the cars that
9 morning.
In fact the only witness to the cars at Luton that gave evidence was Susan Clarke and she only contacted the police on the morning of 12th July according to her testimony. Ms Gallagher had previously adduced that the viewing logs from Luton station were dated 10th and 11th July.

(iv) The missing CCTV evidence from the day gives cause for concern. No explanation was given for the failure of the CCTV at King's Cross underground station, ticket barriers or platforms, nor CCTV shown of Hasib Hussain's apparent re-entry to the mainline station from the Northern Line platform as asserted in evidence and in the government narrative. There is a major discrepancy between the timings of the CCTV shown from WH Smiths and the time on the receipt of a purchase of a battery. There is also missing CCTV from Woodall Service Station of nearly 15 minutes between exiting and rejoining the motorway. Strange and unexplained cuts in the CCTV shown from Luton Station car park. The removal of the Fiat Brava CCTV was not shown, nor was an explanation given for why Bedfordshire Police requested its removal. No explanation was given for the turning off of CCTV at McDonald's prior to Hasib entering, nor was the time of this incident given. No explanation for the lack of CCTV from the 91 bus was adduced, nor was a reason why this bus halted and emptied its passengers at Euston Station. No CCTV from the trains prior to the explosions was shown, nor was it even claimed to exist, despite a claim by Rachel North regarding a discussion held in May 2006 between survivors and bereaved and the then Home Secretary, John Reid:
The first question was from a man who lost his boyfriend at Russell Square who wanted to know if there were CCTV images of the bombers on the trains, and whether he could see the last minutes of his loved one. The Counter Terrorism representative said that there were, but they had not been released, as the post-bomb CCTV images 'were disturbing'. Dr. Reid promised to investigate whether images of the train before the bomb could be shown privately to the bereaved man. It sounded like the CCTV images were not of good quality.
The public have been shown CCTV evidence from the Operation Vivace (21 July 2005) trial of the men on CCTV from the train carriages which were of good quality, we suggest similar evidence could and should be shown to the Inquests as the presence of those accused of the underground incidents has only been shown as far as King's Cross Thameslink. It should also be able to show the presence of MSK and Tanweer for a considerable length of time on journeys away from King's Cross, and also the entry of three accused onto the carriages from King's Cross.

This lack of evidential continuity between all of the 4 accused and the actual scenes is very concerning. This sentiment was expressed to survivors by 'C', DCI SO15:
One of the many things that police have to prove is the 'evidential continuity' of exhibits, sometimes even from before they become significant as exhibits. This continuity is an issue which is subject of detailed scrutiny in legal proceedings. The whole process is carefully documented, and any break in this documentation immediately devalues the exhibit.
(v) No 'life extinct' pronounced at either Tavistock Square, nor the Piccadilly Line train. The numbers pronounced for life extinct at Aldgate and Edgware Road by Dr Morgan Costello were both one less than would account for the presence of either Mohammed Sidique Khan or Shehzad Tanweer at the respective locations they are alleged to have been at.

(vi) The types of explosives allegedly used differed between Clifford Todd's testimony and the sworn testimony adduced during the Jean Charles de Menezes Inquest. Clifford Todd stated HMTD was found in Alexandra Grove, in the cars, with further traces found at the scenes.
2 A. Well, from just those results, clearly we wouldn't have
3 been able to say that, but the conclusion that it's
4 likely that it was HMTD and hydrogen peroxide and pepper
5 comes from the accumulation of all the other evidence
6 from Alexandra Grove and the various components that
7 were physical items that were actually found from
8 Russell Square and, indeed, the other scenes.
'Codename Neil', the forensics officer at the scene claims TATP was found in both the Micra and Alexandra Grove.
4 them in the car and take them with them. Once again,
15 there was evidence of TATP explosive at the bomb-making
16 factory in Leeds.
and:
23 cable, they found flash bulbs which will be a typical
24 igniter for, as it was, TATP explosives.
DAC McDowall, the gold command for Operation Theseus:
12.... In the bomb factory in Leeds that was
13 discovered, we found TATP literally sprayed around the
14 premises and on the floor. If I can say that that
15 explosive will detonate if trodden on
and:
19 A. That was a distinct possibility, yes, particularly
20 given, perhaps I should amplify, the amount of explosive
21 left behind, if I can use that expression, by the 7 July
22 bombers was of a very great magnitude. Certainly
23 a bathful and more of the main charge, and as I said
24 yesterday, a very substantial quantity of the
25 excessively volatile TATP on 7 July.

157

1 SIR MICHAEL WRIGHT: This was all in the Yorkshire bomb
2 factory, this is what you found and presumably
3 neutralised?
DIC Purser, describes 'brown sludge' as 'not explosives' and only describes this as being only in the bath at Alexandra Grove:
15 Q. Did you go on to tell them that further enquiries had
16 taken you to West Yorkshire, you gave a particular
17 address in Leeds, and you said that that was discovered
18 to be the bomb factory?
19 A. Yes, it was.
20 Q. Did you tell them that examination of that scene was
21 ongoing, but that a brown sludge had been found in the
22 bath? Examination indicated that it was not explosives.
23 Porton Down had indicated that it was not a biological
24 substance but they weren't sure what it was, and had
25 said it might be some kind of insecticide?
J7 can provide many more examples of areas of questioning that a resumed Inquest into the four should examine to ensure that it is possible for a true and accurate account of the events in London on 7th July 2005 to be placed before the public.

For truth and justice

“To the living we owe respect,
but to the dead we owe only the truth.”
- Voltaire

Sunday, 27 February 2011

MI5 taking the PISCES - Part 1

Week 18 of the 7/7 Inquest proceedings from 21st to 24th February was scheduled to hear evidence regarding Preventability issues. The corporate witness for MI5 - Witness G was allocated two days, ACC Parkinson for West Yorkshire Police a day, and the final day was to hear evidence from ex-Metropolitan Police DAC Peter Clarke as well as DS Prunty of SO13. The lead counsel on Preventability issues was Patrick O'Connor assisted by Caoilfhionn Gallagher, both representing the bereaved families.

Witness G was instead on the stand for over 3½ days yet, on critical matters, Witness G claimed to know nothing. For those watching in the press and public annexe, also set-up by De Boers, Witness G's testimony was listened to while staring at a blank screen where the witness being questioned would usually appear. Often nothing was heard in response to questioning as Witness G simply nodded his responses. Noteworthy is that the deferential Hugo Keith QC failed to pull Witness G up on his repeated nodded responses, in the same way he would usually admonish a witness by making the point that the stenographers cannot hear a nod. Also interesting was the apparent appointment of new stenographers -- the live transcriptions come into their own when the microphones aren't working, something which generally occurs when counsel other than Keith interject or begin their questioning -- to replace the usual team owing to the high-security required by MI5 to put Witness G on the stand. This meant we were treated to 'petty criminal' appearing on the screen that carries the live transcriptions as 'pet tea criminal'. There were also long delays before each day's transcripts and adduced evidence appeared on the Inquests public website. In fact, a number of pieces of adduced evidence have yet to appear on the Inquests web site owing to "issues with the publication of these documents" that are being worked through with the American authorities. Unsurprisingly, these document relate specifically to the fantastical case of the FBI's star Supergrass/Informant, Mohammed Junaid Babar.

So how and why did Witness G's appearance get dragged out for 3½ days? Simply because, after being denied permission to make public Witness G's written statements, Mr Eadie, QC for the Home Secretary and the Security Service, decided to force the issue by insisting that G's three written statements be adduced into evidence and published on the Inquests website. Highly irregular behaviour, as pointed out by both Hugo Keith and Justice Hallett, given that G's evidence should be his oral testimony, not prior written statements. Only those pages actually referred to and shown during his oral testimony would go into the evidence published by the Inquests, and it was argued by counsel that this was sufficient as the Inquests had done justice to the written statements in examining each area. Eadie was insistent and informed the Inquest and the many bereaved families present that he would then take Witness G through each page and in that way get the full written statement adduced. Wednesday was expended through little more than G's simple repeated responses of "Yes", "No", "Don't know" and "I agree" to Eadie. The day that should have been available to Patrick O'Connor QC, the advocate to the bereaved, to examine the evidence of West Yorkshire Police was robbed from them in a most cynical way. So too was most of Thursday. The three remaining witnesses were left with a little over three hours in which to give evidence and answer questions. Malfeasant filibustering on behalf of the State indeed.

Evidence

Were these 3½ days useful in terms of evidence? The press picked up on the fact that severely cropped photos of Shehzad Tanweer and Mohammed Sidique Khan were sent to the FBI to be shown to Supergrass/FBI informer Mohammed Junaid Babar in order to identify the members of the 'Crevice Plot'. Khan's photo was so badly cropped that it wasn't even shown to Babar. The ludicrous explanation from G was that the original photo would have shown the covert nature of the photograph and could reveal where it had been taken. Even the deferential Hugo Keith could not allow this explanation to go by unchallenged and asked if it was thought that Babar would be capable of recognising Toddington Service Station. Keith also ventured that one of his progeny could do a better job. Whether the FBI might not have had access to colour imaging systems in 2004 raised another note of disbelief from Keith: "America is not the other side of the moon. The systems must have been in place to allow a colour photograph to be transmitted to America".


By the end of the first day of Witness G's testimony J7 were compelled to write to the Coroner. We sent the following:
On 21 February pm, Witness G gave the following testimony in relation to a subscriber check on a phone number registered to MSK at 49a Bude Road:

Q. Could we have Security Service document SYS11076 [SYS11076-1], please? You have in the last day or two, G, provided some further details in relation to this call?
A. (Witness nods).
Q. The Security Service gave evidence, did it not, to the Intelligence and Security Committee that the calls were in July and August in their entirety, but, in fact, that was erroneous?
A. No. The calls were in July and August as reported in the ISC report. Our error at that point was saying we had done the subscriber check in July and August rather than March.
Q. I understand. So there were calls -- I think the ISC report showed or stated that there were calls in on 19th July, I think 15th August and -- sorry -- two dates in July and a date, 17th August, but it has subsequently transpired, has it not, that there were more calls on 19th July than the ISC understood?
A. Correct.
Q. The call on 17th August was not 17th August, but 15th August?
A. Correct.
Q. So there were some small errors in relation to the dates given to the Intelligence and Security Committee?
A. (Witness nods).
Q. The essence of the calls was this, was it not: that one of the early significant individuals in the Operation Crevice, the operation from 2003 and through 2004, was in touch with a man called Sidique Khan, who gave that address, but that was all it was understood to be?
A. It is not actually right to say he gave that address. That was the subscriber address for the telephone.
Q. If a check had been done, if a check had been done, and I am not suggesting that that single call necessitated a check, it would have shown that there was a person in touch with Mohammed Qayum Khan called Sidique Khan of 49A Bude Road?
A. That was a subscriber to the phone, yes.
Q. Operation Crevice, which included this man Mohammed Qayum Khan, gave rise to thousands upon thousands of what you have described earlier as call events, data events?
A. (Witness nods).

What explanation is there for a subscriber check on 11/03/2003 - 6 months before the phone call from 'Q' to a phone registered to MSK at 49a Bude Road in July 2003? 11/03/2003 would appear to be prior to the date of 'late March 2003' given for the start of Operation Crevice in the ISC II report.

J7's question was put to Witness G the following day and his response elicited another missive from J7 to the Inquests:
J7 appreciate that the Inquest team examined our query in relation to the subscriber check on the MSK phone 49a Bude Road carried out on 11 March 2003.

This response from Witness G to the question in relation to the subscriber check being carried out in March 2003 was due to the MSK phone number appearing on Mohammed Quayyam Khan's billing prior to the beginning of Operation Crevice.

Q. You told us that one of the other investigative links to the man called Sidique Khan was the subscriber check on 11 March 2003 which showed that a phone was registered to his name and the address at 49A Bude Road, we know subsequently to have been the Iqra bookshop, and you, therefore, would have been able to assess that one of the calls made in July and August by Mohammed Qayum Khan, one of the participants in Crevice in the early days, was to that name and address?
A. (Witness nods).
Q. Why was a subscriber check being done in March if the calls from Mohammed Qayum Khan were not until July and August?
A. Because, at that point, we were reviewing earlier billing on Mohammed Qayum Khan on which that number came up.
Q. Oh, I see, so the Crevice operation, having started earlier in the year, had meant that there were checks from the very beginning going on in relation to calls made by the participants --
A. That's correct.
Q. -- which is why a check was made in March?
A. That's correct.
Q. So Crevice started long before July and August, towards the early part of 2003, in fact.
A. In the early part of 2003, yes.
Q. Before 11 March, presumably?
A. Yes, I can't remember the exact date, but certainly before then.
Q. But logically, it must have been before.

The ISC II report detailed timeline p58 makes the claim that the date of 13 July 2003 is significant in relation to MSK "as data from a mobile phone associated with MQK shows a number of calls with a telephone number MI5 had not seen before..... MI5 cannot match the name Siddique Khan with any on their databases and the contact is not investigated any further".

Do we now know that MI5 had seen this number before and the name MSK was presumably recorded in their databases from the check carried out on 11 March 2003? Why did the check on 13 July 2003 not flag this contact up?

This point was, sadly, clumsily handled by the seemingly pressurised O'Connor, who was faced with a mountain of evidence with which to question Witness G and a very short time allocated to him on 23rd February in which to do it:
Q. Could I go to a different topic, please, tab 7 in our core bundle? That is the subscriber check on 11 March 2003. This was kept on Security Service files, was it?
A. On Security Service records, yes.
Q. It's the -- I should identify it. It is SYS11076 [SYS11076-1] it's a subscriber check on 11 March 2003. I'll take you to the reference, if you wish, but ISC2 records when Crevice started as being late March 2003. Do you follow? I'll take to you the reference. It's page 57 in the hard copy, so page 64 of ISC2 which is INQ8305 [INQ8305-63]. Do you see there's a time-line there?
A. I think I have a different one up.
Q. Late March 2003. Is that not -- I'm not saying it's a big error, but is that somewhat in error, then?
A. Well, that would be my view, yes. I mean, having looked at the early part of Crevice, I would have put it a little bit earlier than that.
Q. So that this document falls within Operation Crevice?
A. Yes.
Q. If we go to the next page in the ISC document, so that's page 65 , halfway down the first paragraph, 13 July 2003, if you glance down the first few --
A. I think we're working to different references. The 65 --
Q. I said page 65. It's page 64 [INQ8305-64], I'm sorry, I'm adding seven -- that's what I've been consistently doing, if I'm wrong, I'm wrong. Page 64, then.
A. 13 July 2003, yes, I've got that.
Q. Yes, now, if you please glance down it, but if you go four or five lines down, it says: "MI5 cannot match the name 'Siddique Khan' [spelt with two Ds] with any in their databases ..." Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, you had this telephone subscriber check in your records?
A. Yes, as I explain in, I think, my second statement, or possibly my third, the ISC is in error here because we didn't brief them correctly.
Q. Do you think you didn't brief the ISC correctly because there are two Ds rather than one? Do you see? You're checking, in July 2003, a number against Siddique Khan, two Ds, so that somebody has said, maybe accurately, that MI5 couldn't match Siddique, with two Ds, Khan?
A. No, we didn't brief them correctly because we'd misunderstood what our own records said and believed that this 11 March 2003 date for the check was an error and should have said July, but our reinvestigations recently confirm that 11 March is correct.
Q. So it's not that your systems were flummoxed by there being two Ds rather than one?
A. That's not relevant for the system we're talking about here. The error was ours in assuming that the 11 March date on this document was incorrect when it was, in fact, correct. [23 02 2011 p7:63]
If the honest intent of Witness G was to genuinely assist the Inquest process, he could have chosen to clarify quite why MI5 failed to pick up the name 'Sidique Khan' when searching on the phone number, rather than his name, and also why they claimed to the Intelligence & Security Committee that their checks in July 2003 failed to access and include the recorded March 2003 subscriber check held on their database. Instead, another question has been added into the mix: From where did the Siddique Khan name with two ds originate?

What is blatantly clear from this exchange, apart from the ISC II report being littered with errors, is that in July and August 2003, MI5 knew full well that Mohammed Quayyum Khan, aka 'Q', was in contact with at the very least the Iqra bookshop and, potentially, also in contact with Mohammed Sidique Khan. Given that intercept evidence cannot be used or referred to in proceedings, considered RIPA evidence, there is of course the question of the bugging of 'Q's phone and the fact that there was presumably full knowledge of precisely what was being said. Intercept evidence from phone bugging -- as used extensively during Operation Crevice -- is very likely the untouchable subject referred to in another dead-end exchange between O'Connor and Witness G:
Q. Can we find from here, therefore -- I'm not asking you for anything confidential, but in broad terms -- a pattern of mobile phone use between Mohammed Sidique Khan and Omar Khyam in the lead-up to each of these meetings?
A. Yes, that's fair.
Q. Good. That's what I thought I detected. I'm not going to go behind the redactions.
A. I would be grateful if you didn't.
Q. No, I'm not going to. So obviously somebody has, and you have, reviewed what is the sensitive aspect of this and what is in this document and what's been redacted. Can I ask you this, though, because it's obviously not sensitive that there is this pattern, do you understand: was there similar contact before 21 February 2004?
MR EADIE: My Lady, that's very problematic, or it may be.
MR PATRICK O'CONNOR: Why? It's the same principle. Why is this more secret than what the witness has accepted?
LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think you'd better allow Mr Keith or Mr O'Connor to whisper certain letters in your ear, Mr O'Connor.
MR KEITH: We can't whisper anything, I'm afraid, because that would be equally impermissible.
LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: If supposing, though, that something existed ...
MR KEITH: Could my learned friend ask the question and then we will reassess or rephrase it and then we will see where we need to go thereafter?
MR PATRICK O'CONNOR: Fine. My Lady, what I'm very happy to do is I will rephrase it, just on my feet, and then leave it, everyone can think about it, perhaps speak to me in general terms over the luncheon adjournment and that's it.
....
LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Anyway, try the question again to see whether we can avoid offending any of my rulings, statutory instruments, Parliament Acts, whatever.
MR PATRICK O'CONNOR: Was there any mobile phone contact between a mobile phone attributed to Mohammed Sidique Khan and a mobile phone attributed to Omar Khyam which took place on 20 or 21 February 2004?
A. My Lady, for the reasons you've identified, I don't know whether I can answer this question. [ibid p67:21]
Passports Pakistan and PISCES

One of the other issues examined in relation to Mohammed Junaid Babar was a statement he gave in April/May 2004 regarding meeting with certain members of the 'Crevice plot' at Islamabad airport in June and July of 2003. It was plain that the two men Babar identified as 'Ibrahim' and 'Zubair' could have been identified by accessing the travel information between the UK and Pakistan of Jawad Akbar who was already in custody after the 30 March 2004 Crevice arrests and whose passport details were known. Again J7 were compelled to communicate with the Coroner and Counsel and sent the following communication when Eadie and 'G' sought to confirm how difficult such a process would be:
On 23 February, Mr Eadie questioned how information on travel to and from Pakistan could be acquired by the police:

22 Do you also know -- and, again, say if you don't and
23 we can do some further research -- how the information
24 about Mr Akbar's travel was actually acquired by the
25 police?

90

1 A. I do not, no.
2 Q. You don't know what level of detailed work, diplomatic
3 efforts and mutual legal assistance, treaty requests,
4 had to be made to secure that information?
5 A. I do not, no.

Yet on 19/07/05, 3 days after the formal identification of MSK, the media were able to report all the details of Khan & Tanweer's travel to and from Pakistan including stopovers in Turkey, flight numbers and images from PISCES from November 2004. Passport numbers were also released.

Daily Mirror 19/07/2005

The opening statement of the Crevice trial stated:

86. This is a Time Chart or Time Line. It has, as you will see on the front page, a line alongside each defendant and some other individuals who feature. The purpose of the chart is to indicate, so far as records are available, entry into and departure from, Pakistan. If we go to page 7 for example, we find we are in the period June and July 2003. That was, you may remember, a period of some significance because according to Babar, that was when the Malakand training camp took place.

87. Against that background we see Khyam and Garcia are indeed in Pakistan. If we go back to page 6 we see Khyam arrived on 7 May; if we go back to page 5 we see Garcia arrived on 10 February. Reverting to page 7 we see Shujah arrived on 27 June, with his digital scales you may recall.

88. Jawad Akbar arrived later on 25 July and Khawaja a little earlier on 16 July - they attended later than the first batch you will recall. This chart is dependent upon records - passports and a system called PISCES which Pakistan had introduced only in the last two or three years and not at all airports. Accordingly the records may not be complete and may not cover someone - Amin may be an example - who has been in Pakistan on a long term basis.


As indicated above this information was gathered by the use of passport numbers and PISCES without the use of flight manifests.
J7 could also have detailed an even earlier report that appeared in the Times on 18 July 2005 which also revealed these flight details, and it would be interesting to know The Times' source for this information, particularly if the source was, as is likely, the security services.

Taking the PISCES

PISCES is a system set up in Pakistan by the FBI/CIA to enable live monitoring of passengers through Pakistan's airports. A Times of India report details the link between PISCES and FBI/CIA systems:
The Personal Identification Secure Comparison Evaluation System (PISCES), an automated border control system, is being implemented in 20 ports of immigration in Pakistan.

According to latest information, all points of entry and exit in Pakistan would have PISCES system by Dec 31, 2004.

PISCES is being installed in over a dozen high risk countries of the world at America's instance. However, in Pakistan's case, Timesofindia.com has detailed American plans showing that PISCES is being linked up to Pakistan's internal national information making the situation much more complex.

According to the Mission Performance Plan set by the US embassy in Islamabad, America is presently involved deeply in prodding and forcing Pakistani authorities to develop national intelligence and criminal databases which did not exist till 2001.

Surprisingly this database is linked to the PISCES border control system which is in the hands of US officials.

In the mission document targets, by 2004 end the PISCES system would be "fully operational and integrated with National Crisis Management Cell's intelligence and investigative database".

In 2003, the US embassy was aiming to develop "fully functional intelligence and investigative database" link between provincial Crime Investigation Departments and National Crisis Management cell".

And in 2003 itself, the American plan reveals: "intelligence and investigative database linked with other similar programs, including PISCES border control system."

Startlingly, only in 2005 will Pakistan assume "responsibility for continued operation of PISCES system."

Till then, the US counter-terrorism officials would have control over the sophisticated system that not only records details of every person leaving or entering Pakistan, but would also transmit these details to the central servers of FBI and CIA back in the US.

Details of PISCES installation are detailed in the Mission Performance Plan for 2004, prepared about a year after 9/11 in 2002, and in possession of Timesofindia.com .

Besides PISCES, thousands of closed circuit television networks are being installed across Pakistan.

Over the last two years US policies regarding Pakistan have been unfolding as scripted in the Mission Performance Plan for 2004.
An article on the implementation of PISCES in Malta in 2004 claims:
FBI may have its bugs on Malta’s arrivals and departures

The information on travellers collected by the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES), donated to Malta by the United States, is liable to be shared with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s database and other intelligence agencies, according to a report by the US Congressional Research Service seen by MaltaToday.

PISCES, a $1.5 million (Lm700,000) software package which forms part of the US Department of State’s Terrorist Interdiction Programme, is designed to monitor and restrict the movement of terrorists and other criminals across borders by making real-time comparisons of photographs and other personal details with the FBI database, and analyse traveller information to identify and intercept terrorist suspects.

Malta is in fact the only EU Member State to have allowed the installation of PISCES at all its transit points, namely Malta International Airport, the Sea Passenger Terminal, Ta’ Xbiex Marina and the Gozo ferry terminal.

According to a US Congress report seen by MaltaToday on Pakistan-US Anti-Terrorism Co-operation, PISCES can make “real-time comparisons of photographs and other personal details with the FBI database in order to track the movements of Islamic militants”, as well as containing data on worldwide bomb explosions.
Strange how such a major counter-terrorism system has failed to reach the ears or eyes of as senior a member of MI5 as Witness G:
MR PATRICK O'CONNOR: Right. Was there any system of record-keeping -- it wasn't the Border Agency then, I don't think, in 2001, 2004, 2005, 2003 -- but was there any system of record-keeping -- bare record-keeping -- of departures and arrivals at UK border points?
A. I'm afraid you'd need an expert from the Home Office or the Passport Office or whatever, but my view, based on my limited knowledge of these things, is that they were not, at this time, recording departures from the UK routinely of British citizens, but that is not a certain answer, Mr O'Connor.
Q. Right. Have you heard of something called Operation Theseus?
A. I have.
Q. Is that a system run by the Pakistani -- Pisces, I'm getting muddled.
A. I haven't.
Q. You haven't heard of Operation Pisces. So I can't ask you anything about that?
A. I'm afraid you can't, no.
Q. Right. I'll state the point, because, my Lady, I'm not being as clear as I might be. The proposition is that the Pakistani authorities, from at least 2002, kept a record of arrivals and departures through all the major airports, including Islamabad, which is the relevant one, and the Security Service has a close liaison partnership with the Pakistani authorities, doesn't it?
A. The UK authorities do, yes.
Q. Is it right that if you asked or instigated a request from the Pakistan authorities for information from any such system, you would expect it to be answered cooperatively by the Pakistani authorities?
A. I don't know, to be honest, Mr O'Connor. It would depend what the question was.
Q. This is not a highly sensitive piece of information to pass to the Security Service here, is it?
A. It really would depend on what the piece of the information was and how the Pakistanis felt.
Why would Witness G choose to claim no knowledge of PISCES in 2011, some 7 years after its implementation? Why would he choose not to assist counsel for the bereaved families by outlining what is commonly known about this system? Frankly, if Witness G is unaware of the PISCES system then he is in the wrong job.

Mr Eadie began the afternoon of the final day's hearing on Preventability by submitting a supplementary response from Witness 'G' into the proceedings which only led to more obfuscation of the issue about whether PISCES was easily accessible and how data from it was accessed in respect of Jawad Akbar's travel to Pakistan:
MR EADIE: Witness G, have you, overnight, had cause to have some researches conducted into what we are calling the manifest point?
A. I have.
Q. Is the product of those researches contained in a --
MR KEITH: It's on the system, if my learned friend needs it, at temp 2.
MR EADIE: Can we have that up on the screen, please [SYS-manifest document]? I don't know if we can blow that up a little. It's not very legible. G, I want particularly to focus, if I may, on paragraph 3 of that document, taking the rest of it as read, as it were. So far as that is concerned, is it your understanding that a formal request was made by the Metropolitan Police post-arrest in order to obtain details about Akbar's travel?
A. It is my understanding.
Q. What was the date on which that request was made?
A. June 2005.
Q. When was a response received from the Pakistani authorities in relation to that?
A. That was received in September 2005.
Q. Is that the date we see in subparagraph (d) of paragraph 3?
A. It is.
Q. In order to produce that result, had the Pakistani authorities simply gone to an airline and got the manifest details with a list of all the passengers?
A. They had not.
Q. What had they gone to?
A. They had interrogated their system, Pisces.
Q. What does that give you?
A. Pisces, as I understand it, is a central system operated by the Pakistani authorities which will offer a date and time of passing through immigration control for named individuals, not flight manifests.
Q. As part of that, as we see from paragraph 3(a), the form in which that request was made was by way of a request for mutual legal assistance, was it?
A. That is correct.
Q. The response that came back was, what? It was in the form of a statement, according to 3(c). Is that right?
A. That's my understanding.
Q. That gave a flight number and carrier and route?
A. That is correct.
Q. As a result of that, the Met made further enquiries; yes?
A. That's correct.
Q. Those are set out in subparagraph (e) of paragraph 3. Is that right?
A. They are.
Q. As a result of that, because those enquiries were carried out after the 7/7 attacks, it was by that date known that Ibrahim was, in fact, MSK. Is that right?
A. That is correct.
Q. It was through that route, and that route only, that they arrived at MSK being on that flight?
A. That is correct.
Q. Could we go to the next page, please, on the screen? Is the point that is the core point that's being made in paragraph 4 that SYS wouldn't have had any reason, prior to March 2005, to make a any sort of similar request to the Pakistani authorities? Why is that?
A. Because we wouldn't have required that for intelligence purposes, unlike the Met requiring it for evidential purposes.
Q. What's the significance of the March 2005 date?
A. In March 2005, that's when we received the additional information from Mohammed Junaid Babar.
Q. If you had made a similar request, does paragraph 5 then set out the additional steps that you would have needed to take in order to achieve an identification result?
A. Yes, I think that's correct.
Q. Paragraph 6 looks, unless I'm missing something, to be something of a repetition of what we've already seen in paragraph 3: namely, the date of the request by the Met and the date on which the response was given. Is that right?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. Then in paragraph 7, you deal with the most likely mechanism for seeking to establish the identity of Ibrahim, which was through photographs. Is that right?
A. That's correct.
Q. Rather than this sort of, as we now know it would have to have been, convoluted process?
A. That's correct.
Q. In any event, paragraph 8 is dealing with whether or not you had enough specific details at the time to make a sensible interrogation of the Pakistani authorities even assuming that time and everything else permitted?
A. That's correct.
MR EADIE: I'm grateful. Thank you, Witness G. [24/02/11 p1:19]
Witness G is claiming that a multi-million dollar system installed by the US could not have been accessed simply through searching for a passport number or a known flight number and/or date for the passengers that had passed through, despite all this information being stored by the system. 'G' also claims that this could only be accessed through the hard copy of Javad Akbar's passport which showed an entry stamp for 25 July 2003. This hardly answers how Mohammed Siddique Khan's and Shehzad Tanweer's flight details were printed in the Times just 11 days after 7/7, on 18 July 2005.

Not to be deterred O'Connor attempted one last time to clarify how PISCES could have been interrogated to enable the identification of 'Ibrahim' and 'Zubair' between March 2004 and July 2005. This exchange also reveals some of the assumptions that Justice Hallett is content to make over this issue and is a cause of concern in anticipating how she will rule and on what basis at the end of these proceedings, which should only be on fact and evidence not assumption. It also reveals some of the frustrations and tensions that have built up over 'G's extended appearance and the pressures that have arisen in the short time allowed for Mr O'Connor to make essential points to the Inquests:
Q. Finally, this gist gives us a helpful indication through other enquiries that were made about the time lag that in fact happened between the enquiry of the Pakistan authorities in June 2005, about Akbar, and the witness statement being produced on 6 September 2005. Do you follow?
A. I do.
Q. Query, do you allow the receipt of the formal witness statement may not actually reflect precisely the receipt of the bare information. It's possible that was communicated --
LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Wait a minute, Mr O'Connor, I'm sorry, I'm stopping you here. This was a request made by UK authorities after London had just been blown up.
MR PATRICK O'CONNOR: Oh yes, yes, yes.
LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You cannot ask me to find as a fact that you'd have received the same kind of rapid cooperation if some kind of request had been sent years before in relation to somebody they didn't really know much about. I'm sorry, that is not a good point and I am not going to allow you to pursue it.
MR PATRICK O'CONNOR: My Lady, the point is, in fact, the opposite. This is my last question, my Lady, and I have a document to go to, so we're talking about, once I ask this question --
LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: All right, carry on.
MR PATRICK O'CONNOR: My Lady, may I explain why it's the opposite? Because it's the very fact that Akbar is in custody and the authorities had this information from his passport anyway, as this gist points out. So this enquiry was not actually urgent and, by contrast, the enquiry about Ibrahim was because he's free and potentially a threat. Does my Lady see the point?
LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr O'Connor, unless I'm going to ask Witness G to take me through the kind of time-lag you get from requests to foreign countries we will be here for, I suspect, days. I have done a number of cases involving requests to foreign countries. I suspect you have too. And the response from foreign countries varies enormously, depending on the circumstances, both in our country, in their countries, and their response. I am not going to enable you to make a bad point without saying to Witness G: go away and get me the evidence about the average response time to an ordinary request to Pakistan.
MR PATRICK O'CONNOR: My Lady, I'm sorry, but the tension between us at this moment is entirely a result of the way this morning was very substantially expended without very much product. My Lady, I would like, please -- there is going to be no such explanation as you fear. There is one document which illustrates my point very simply and clearly. Can I ask for it to be put up, we'll see it and we'll see the time-lag?
LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You can ask for it to be put up, because I'm going to let you just have this one last piece of leeway. If you describe a tension, it is because parties -- wrongly, in my view, and wrongly in law -- have been treating these proceedings as if they are adversarial. They have been accusing Counsel to the Inquests of asking questions with a particular motive in mind.
MR PATRICK O'CONNOR: We haven't, my Lady.
LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr O'Connor, may I finish, please?
MR PATRICK O'CONNOR: Yes.
LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: They act for me and they do not take sides, and if tension is arising in these proceedings, I attribute it solely to the way some parties have been treating these proceedings. So could we please all allow the temperatures to calm or to lower and for everybody's tempers to calm down and to focus on the issues which can properly be put to the witnesses. Right, you have two minutes.
MR PATRICK O'CONNOR: Could we please have [INQ9398-2] up,please? Could it be expanded? Do you see this is a Pisces answer to a request for information?
A. So it appears to me. I'm not familiar with these.
Q. You see that it is a reply of 22 August 2005.
A. Is that in the top right, Mr O'Connor? I can barely read it.
Q. I agree. Do you see "Available query particulars, query date 22 August 2005"?
A. Yes.
Q. And you see "deputy command", blah blah blah,"Islamabad, through Pisces via letter", blah blah blah, "dated 22 August 2005"?
A. No, I'm afraid I can't read the second bit, but I'm assuming that is what it says.
Q. That is what it says. Do you agree this query is very likely to have been sent after the 7 July bombings, there's no reason for it to have been sent before?
A. It is likely, but I do not know.
Q. If this answer -- I've asked Mr Hill to help us on this, and Mr Hill is nodding, my Lady, I asked him earlier today to save time -- but if this answer is dated 22 August 2005, it shows that there's a time-lag of some six weeks or so, seven weeks perhaps. Is that right?
MR HILL: Can I help?
MR PATRICK O'CONNOR: Thank you.
MR HILL: Request made on 1 August, answered on the 22nd.
MR PATRICK O'CONNOR: Three weeks. My Lady, I apologise for going beyond the two minutes, but it has established something which is informative and takes us well, well, well beneath the four months appearing in this gist in relation to those other enquiries. That's all I ask. Thank you. [ibid p8:10]


This still doesn't explain how the Times was reporting this information on 18/07/2005 when the Metropolitan Police Service hadn't received this response until 22/08/2005!

In a final desperate bid to get clarity on the issue of being able to know - in the case of someone who is suspected of involvement with terrorism - their movements in and out of the UK without the use of intrusive action (as claimed by 'G' in point 8 of this witness statement) O'Connor makes an appeal to Justice Hallett for this question to be asked of the Security Services:
MR PATRICK O'CONNOR: The ideal answer would be: with the passport number and date of birth of a terrorism suspect we can tag that passport number and name and date of birth on a computer system and, when somebody travels -- I know I'm not going to get this, but this is the ideal -- when somebody travels, leaves Heathrow and arrives in Pakistan, we know about it. Now, I can't be told all of that, but the thrust and common sense of it is: actually, we have a facility which is regularly used, which can easily be used, not intrusive actions at all, whereby we can monitor the movements of terrorism suspects. Now, my Lady's, I'm sure, got the point, it can be formulated much better than I've formulated it now.
LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: For a start, before anybody goes off with the idea that is the case --
MR PATRICK O'CONNOR: Yes, I agree. I --
LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Pause. We don't know that that was the case back in 2004/2005, and we don't know whether the kind of actions you're describing do come within the kind of material which the authorities would rather I dealt with in closed session.
MR PATRICK O'CONNOR: I understand. That precise, detailed information could well raise public interest immunity issues, but some piece of information, which will assist my Lady to reach a fair conclusion as to the facility with which that kind of tracking could be done at the time without setting out how it was actually done, and the way the state of play at the moment is, well, it's all disproportionate and may involve intrusive actions and really it's not really on.
LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right, so the question would be: was there an ability to monitor the international travel of Mohammed Sidique Khan by name --
MR PATRICK O'CONNOR: Yes.
LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: -- and passport number?
MR PATRICK O'CONNOR: Yes. [ibid p113:5]
J7 suggest that the actual answer as to whether a known suspect can be monitored on entry or exit from the UK will be a resounding 'Yes' - especially when travelling to or from Pakistan. That was, after all, one of the primary requirements for and functions of PISCES intended to benefit the Intelligence agencies. Where this information will matter is when DCS McKenna of the Metropolitan Police gives evidence about Operation Theseus on 3rd March as the final witness to face the 7/7 Inquests.

J7 asked in our submission to the Inquests quite how Mohammed Junaid Babar was able to enter and exit the UK at least 3 times without coming to the attention of the Intelligence Services. This brings us on to the issue of the FBI and possible CIA involvement in Operation Crevice.

The FBI


Peter Taylor Report, BBC News from J7 Truth Campaign on Vimeo.

From 11 February 2004 an Executive Liaison Group met daily to discuss Operation Crevice, these meetings were chaired by DAC Peter Clarke. As reported by Peter Taylor in the news report embedded above, there was constant live intelligence shared between the FBI and their counterparts in the UK and we suggest this also included input into these ELG meetings. If Mohammed Junaid Babar was not working for the FBI in February 2004 what precisely merited the involvement of the US in what was perceived to be a domestic threat to the UK by UK citizens?

Part II to follow