Showing posts with label Shehzad Tanweer. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Shehzad Tanweer. Show all posts

Tuesday, 12 July 2011

Murdoch phone hacking and 7/7 Investigation

From: "J7: The July 7th Truth Campaign"
To: homeaffcom@parliament.uk
Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2011

To the members of the Home Affairs Select Committee

The revelations of phone hacking by News International calls into question the role of the police and the Murdoch press during the investigation into the London Bombings on July 7th 2005.

A Times report written by Daniel McGrory and dated 25/08/2005:
The youngest of the July 7 bombers, he made three desperate telephone calls begging for help from the other members of the terror cell minutes before he blew himself up on a London bus.

The frantic last messages are seen by Scotland Yard as vivid proof that the British-born Muslim extremists intended to die in the attacks.

Knowing that all four men were supposed to synchronise the timing of the explosions, Hussain ran out of King’s Cross Underground station and tried to reach his accomplices by mobile telephone.

It was just before 9am, but by then all his fellow bombers were already dead. The other three had triggered their devices within seconds of one another at 8.50am.

Hussain is believed to have first called Mohammad Sidique Khan, 30, the alleged leader of the group, saying: “I can’t get on a train. What should I do ?” Then in quick succession he left the same message for Shehzad Tanweer and Jermaine Lindsay as, clearly agitated about his next move, he hurried away from the station.

A police source who has heard the telephone calls said: “His voice was getting more and more frantic with each call.” Investigators could tell from his breathless voice that Hussain was walking fast as he made these calls.

These messages were not played nor even were they claimed to exist during the recent 7/7 Inquests.

We need to know:

Did the Times hack the phone messages of the 4 accused of 7/7?

Who was the ‘police source’ who gave this information to the Times?

Why did the 7/7 Inquests not have an opportunity to hear these messages?

Why did the 7/7 Inquests not refer to these messages?

Regards

J7: the July 7th Truth Campaign

Thursday, 7 July 2011

6th Anniversary of 7/7

On the 6th anniversary of 7/7, J7 are once again forced to reiterate our demand for a fully Independent Public Inquiry held outside of the constraints of the Inquiries Act 2005.

At the conclusion of the 7/7 Inquests, Lady Justice Hallett named the 4 accused, Khan, Tanweer, Hussain and Lindsay as the perpetrators of the events of 7/7, despite the clear legal constraints that apply to Coroners and their ability to apportion guilt. Hallett concluded the inquest proceedings by refusing to resume the Inquests into the deaths of the 4. As part of our efforts to get to the truth of 7/7, J7 submitted a clear, detailed and reasoned submission to the inquests outlining why the resumption of these Inquests was imperative. J7's submission for resumption can be read here

As we stated in our submission:
  • The lack of representation of the families of the 4 men allowed any and all of the evidence presented to go unchallenged, meaning no witnesses called to the inquests were cross examined on behalf of the families of the accused.
  • The Inquests sat without a jury.
  • The Metropolitan Police investigation, Operation Theseus, was deemed to be outside the scope of the Inquests and thus the entire investigation behind Ian Blair's "largest criminal inquiry in English history" remains unexamined and unquestioned.
  • The Inquests for the 4 accused, in which a verdict of suicide would require a criminal standard of proof, were not resumed.
There are many glaring holes in the evidence that was presented to the Inquests, as detailed on the J7: 7/7 Inquests Blog which we set-up specially to report on the inquests, yet these potential showstoppers for the official narrative of events went unreported in the mainstream media. The absolute pressing necessity for a fully independent Public Inquiry is now greater than ever in order to enable anyone to have any confidence in the evidence by which the guilt or innocence of the four accused might be established. To date there has been no proper legal scrutiny of this evidence. Furthermore, in cases of alleged suicide, the intent to commit suicide must be proven and this burden of proof has not yet been met.

Without a full Public Inquiry, it remains the case that:
  • The bodies of Tanweer and Khan were not included in the 'Life Extinct' body counts carried out on 7th July by Dr Morgan Costello.
  • The police viewing of the Luton Station CCTV footage was conducted as early as 10th July, despite the official account clearly stating that the men were identified on CCTV at King's Cross Thameslink on 11th July, and that it was this discovery that led the investigation to Luton as a possible site of interest.
  • There exist no sightings of three of the men, Khan Tanweer and Lindsay, after the footage from King's Cross Thameslink, some way from the Underground tube network. Apparently the temporary CCTV system that was installed at King's Cross underground malfunctioned for the 20 crucial minutes between 8.30 and 8.50. Additionally, there are no recordings of the three from any other cameras. This means that there is absolutely no CCTV evidence that shows three of the accused anywhere on the London Underground network on the morning of 7 July 2005.
  • No CCTV from the pre-explosion tube carriages has been released, despite this CCTV apparently existing, and despite it being crucial evidence which could confirm or deny that three of the men boarded the carrriages they are alleged to have boarded. This CCTV should also have been made available to Colonel Mahoney when the expensive modelling of likely injuries sustained by the deceased was conducted to make up for the lack of any internal post mortems on the victims.
  • No CCTV exists from McDonald's showing whether Hussain actually used the premises to insert a new 9v battery into his apparently malfunctioning bomb, as it was revealed during the inquests that the store manager can be seen on CCTV (oh the irony) turning off the CCTV system before Hussain entered.
  • No CCTV exists of Hasib Hussain on either of the buses he is alleged to have boarded. There is no footage of Hussain aboard the number 91 bus, nor the number 30 bus he is alleged to have destroyed, nor is there any street or traffic camera footage showing him boarding either bus.
  • There is a huge discrepancy between the explosives allegedly used, as given in sworn evidence to the Jean Charles de Menezes Inquest, and the evidence that Clifford Todd gave to the 7/7 Inquests.
  • There is strong evidence in the public domain to suggest that at the heart of the story behind 7/7 lay at least three operatives for both the British and American Intelligence services, one of which served an insanely short period in a US prison, for greater crimes than those his testimony put behind bars for far longer terms, before being quietly released.
These questions and many more can be found on the 7/7 Inquests blog.

Six years on from an event with the largest single loss of life in London since the blitz can the Metropolitan Police, with it's long track record of complicity in facilitating Miscarriages of Justice -- and given the recent revelations that it is implicated in the Murdoch News of the World phone hacking scandal -- be allowed to offer a 'narrative' which is so deeply flawed and suspect? How about a 'narrative' which has remained unexamined and unchallenged except by J7? A 'narrative' that has ascribed guilt to four men without their families having the opportunity and legal representation to question, particularly when the four accused have been denied their own Inquest proceedings? Or a 'narrative' deemed outside the scope of inquiry by the 7/7 Inquests, and a 'narrative' which has led to the demonisation of the Muslim population? This is the same flawed and unproven narrative that has been the basis for the questioning of multi-culturalism and a 'narrative' which has done much to fuel the race-hate and bigotry of the far-right neo-fascist organisation, the EDL.

Current Prime Minister, David Cameron, has announced not one but two inquiries into the ongoing criminal exploits and activities of the press and police, just as news was breaking that the families of 7/7 victims were also victims of phone hacking at the hands of Murdoch media. This means that, as if we woke to find outselves in the midst of a Kafka novel, it is apparently right and proper to investigate whether or not the families of 7/7 victims had their mobile phones hacked, but it is not right and proper to have a full, in-depth, independent public investigation into how those same families of the 7/7 victims lost their loved ones.

J7: The July 7th Truth Campaign continue to say NO! This will not stand! Only a fully Independent Public Inquiry held outside of the constraints of the Inquiries Act 2005 has the vaguest chance of getting to the truth behind the 'narrative' of 7/7.

J7 will be writing again in the near future to ask for your continued support in our joint campaign for the truth about 7/7, and we will provide a few suggestions for ways you can help us pressure the government into commissioning an independent public inquiry.

For truth and justice,
J7: The July 7th Truth Campaign

Wednesday, 15 June 2011

A Nissan Micra Tardis?

The official narrative would have us believe that three of the 7/7 accused, Khan, Tanweer and Hussain, left Leeds in the early hours of the morning of 7th July 2005 after visiting 18 Alexandra Grove (the apparent 'bomb factory') and loading a rented Nissan Micra with home-made explosives of the type shown here:

The quantity of 'bulk explosives' claimed to have been found at 18 Alexandra Grove

According to the testimony of senior forensic investigator, Clifford Todd, only one of these substances was shown to be potentially viable as an explosive.
Q. Were there different types of sludge at the address?
A. Yes, there were two types. One was much darker than the other. One was a fairly light, sandy, yellow-brown colour. The other type was a much darker brown colour.
Q. Was there a difference between them, their effects?
A. Yes. The darker brown material, after various tests done at the laboratory, was found not to be energetic, so would not work as an explosive. The lighter, sandy-coloured material, that was shown, in at least one specific case, to be a high explosive.
That none of these containers could be forensically linked by either DNA or fingerprints to any of the four accused is an area which received no scrutiny or examination when DC Reynolds, of SO15 Counter-terrorism Command forensic management team, gave his testimony. Hussain's fingerprints were apparently found on only one plastic container which it was claimed contained HMTD. [1/02/2011 p13 13-15]

So, after collecting approx 40Kg of a light brown sludge that in "at least one specific case" could potentially possess explosive properties, the three men drove off in the rented Nissan Micra. Of note is that any less than "at least one specific case" would in fact mean that the sludge was potentially explosive in exactly "no specific case".

Despite much discussion of counter-surveillance methods by the use of 'operational phones' solely for use between the four accused, Shehzad Tanweer appears to have been quite content to give his 'operational phone' number on the rental agreement for the hired Micra. We know this because it is claimed that the car hire company called this phone on 7th July at 14.58, although, perhaps a little strangely, this was before the end of the rental period and we can only wonder what might have prompted this contact. This point was also contradicted by the statements from the car hire company read to the Inquests on 14/10/2010. [See pages 44 & 47]



A Nissan Micra is a very small car with a very limited boot capacity - yet it contained three men, two cool boxes, 40Kg of bulk explosives, five large rucksacks and a variety of other items, as shown in the picture below:


The items that were forensically linked to Khan, we are told, did not include the rucksack left behind in the Micra, nor the cool boxes which presumably contained the explosive substance, but  were  instead innocuous everyday items to which everyone can be forensically linked at a moment's notice: carrier bags, biros, sweet wrappers, etc.

According to the read statement of Sarah Lancaster, a Senior Case Officer in the Forensic Explosives Laboratory, also contained within the Micra must have been freezer ice blocks:
Based on my observations at the scene, my subsequent examination of the items submitted to this laboratory and in conjunction with the police photographs provided, it is my opinion that the damage in and around carriage 6713 of the Circle Line Underground train was consistent with a detonation of several kilograms, probably in the order of 10 kilograms, of a high explosive substance. [2/02/11 p46:6]

... exhibits which were reassembled to demonstrate that they were part of the freezer ice blocks and packs wrapped around the bomb. She concluded: "The use of freezer ice blocks and packs primarily suggests that it was necessary to keep a component of the IED cool. [ibid p50:15]



No explanation is given for the contents of the black bags in the right hand cool box - what did they contain?

After arriving at Luton station car park, and parking next to Lindsay's Fiat Brava, we presume that the men stood at the boot of the Micra and assembled their explosive devices - if they were already packed, primed and ready to go inside the rucksacks there would have been little need for the ice packs inside the cool boxes. It is also hard to see where five rucksacks already packed with explosives would have fitted into the Micra along with the three men as the boot was already full with the cool boxes.

Would any serious 'terrorists' with murder on their minds choose to park at a busy commuter station next to a pay and display machine and adjacent to an exit from the car park - in the position that the two blue cars can be seen in the image below - during the early morning rush hour if they were intending to construct these devices, packing them with ice packs and inserting initiating devices of wires, light bulbs and batteries? Standing at a boot of a car at a busy commuter station on the outskirts of London during one of its busiest times, in broad daylight, all watched over by CCTV machines of convenient fail?

Luton Station car park showing the area where the Brava and Micra parked

Is it even vaguely credible that the scenario described above is actually what really happened on the morning of the 7th July 2005?

Really?

Monday, 21 March 2011

J7 Submission for Resumption of Inquests into the four

Following an order by Lady Justice Hallett requesting representations regarding the resumption of inquests into the deaths of the four, subsequent to the conclusion of the hearings in relation to the inquests of the 52 deceased, J7 issued the following.

Note: Footnotes in the original document have been converted to direct links.

J7: The July 7th Truth Campaign
Submission for Resumption

Further to Lady Justice Hallett's order dated 11th March 2011, which reads as follows:

IN THE INNER WEST LONDON (WESTMINSTER) CORONER’S COURT CORONER’S INQUESTS INTO THE LONDON BOMBINGS OF 7 JULY 2005
_____________________________________________
ORDER
_____________________________________________
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Any person wishing to make representations to the Coroner as to whether or not any or all of the inquests into the deaths of Mohammed Siddique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer, Jermaine Lindsay and Hasib Hussain should be resumed must notify the Solicitor to the Inquests in written submissions by 4.00 p.m. on Friday 18th March 2011.

2. Any such written submissions must identify in full the grounds on which the person on whose behalf they are filed claims to have an interest in the relevant inquest(s) and the grounds upon which it is said the inquests must be resumed.
With regard to the issue of the legality of not resuming the Inquests into the deaths of the four accused, we submit that the legal right to an Inquest where no Inquiry is held overrides all other considerations:
The right to an inquest

An inquest must be held in those circumstances where a Coroner is informed that the body of a person is lying within his or her district and there is reasonable cause to suspect that the individual died:

A violent or unnatural death or
A sudden death of which the cause is unknown or.
In prison or in such circumstances as to require an inquest under any other Act.

The Coroner only has a right to hold an inquest if one of these conditions is satisfied. Conversely, the Coroner cannot decide not to hold an inquest if one of the conditions is satisfied.
The pressing need to resume the inquests into the four accused is further compounded by the magnitude and significance of the circumstances in which it is alleged the deaths occurred.

The Inquests into the 52 cannot stand instead of, nor can they be considered as a substitute for, Inquests into the deaths of the four accused; as stated by Hugo Keith QC on many occasions these proceedings omitted the relevant facts:
6 My Lady, in the light of the fact that these
7 inquests are not concerned with Hussain, I have no need
8 to read out the cause of death, but it is obvious.
23 … We're not, of course, concerned with
24 their inquests and so I needn't read out the full detail
We respectfully suggest that a jury be empanelled at the resumed Inquests and that all the circumstances surrounding these deaths be thoroughly examined and explored.

If full arguments are deemed necessary by the Deputy Coroner, then J7 submit the following in favour of resumption of the Inquests into the deaths of Mohammed Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer, Jermaine Lindsay and Hasib Hussain

J7 Interest in the Inquests

J7: The July 7th Truth Campaign is comprised of ordinary members of the public concerned that a fully independent public inquiry, particularly one held outside of the constraints of the Inquiries Act 2005, was refused twice by the government. Over 3,400 people have signed the J7 petition calling on the government to release the evidence they claim to have in support of the story outlined in the meagre 'Report of the official account of the bombings in London on 7th July 2005'.

Our tireless campaigning and research over the last five years, much of which has involved doggedly pursuing responses to Freedom of Information requests, has led to the accumulation of a vast body of knowledge regarding the events of 7th July 2005, contained on our People's Investigation Forum. Our analysis is published on our main web site at: http://julyseventh.co.uk, much of which had been further compiled in order to produce our Submissions to the Inquests. Further, our work was repeatedly, albeit indirectly, referenced throughout the course of proceedings, with the Inquests' own council choosing to mention our 'voluminous' submission as part of his opening statement.

The inquest proceedings transcripts have made reference to J7 as 'a group following the proceedings closely', so our interest in the events of 7 July 2005 and our continued work in this area are well known by all involved and, we submit, part of the grounds on which we should be considered a Properly Interested Party. Our initial submissions certainly provided the basis for some of the lines of enquiry for the inquests of the 52, even if these lines of enquiry were not duly explored.

Concerned at the absence of a jury at the resumed Inquests into the 52 deaths, J7 undertook the role of carefully watching these proceedings and examining the evidence released throughout. J7 wrote to the Deputy Coroner with many of the issues that arose during proceedings and on occasion, questions posed by J7 were put to witnesses. Many of the outstanding questions that arose are documented on the J7: 7/7 Inquests blog.

Despite a mass of evidence adduced before the Inquests into the deaths of 52 people on 7th July 2005, J7 are concerned at the refusal by the Legal Services Commission to grant legal aid for representation at the Inquests to any of the families of the four accused, thus preventing them from making submissions. J7 wrote to the Coroner expressing these concerns in an email dated 25th April 2010:
Our concern is that it has recently been announced that two of the families of the accused men are to be refused legal aid to be represented at the Inquests. Given the immensity of the crimes alleged against them, and the history of miscarriages of justice in the British courts when 'fighting terrorism', as happened in the cases of the Guildford 4, Birmingham 6 etc, we believe that the families of the accused must be given access to justice and representation at the forthcoming Inquest. Without this, British justice remains skewed in favour of the State and will only lead people, especially Muslims, to question whether justice is available to them.
Legal aid at Inquests can be granted in exceptional cases if "there is a wider public interest or it aids the coroner’s investigations". It is most certainly in the wider public interest that legal aid is granted in this case, and we are hopeful that you can, as the coroner, request that the Ministry of Justice review their decision in this matter. We understand that an inquest verdict of suicide requires a criminal standard of proof. Representation of the families would be of great assistance to the inquest's task of determining whether such a verdict is justified.
The arguments for the families of the four to be represented at the Inquests and for resumption are set out in the judicial review dated 27th August 2010 which include the following relevant and important points:
21. On 23 April 2010 the claimant’s solicitor wrote to Mr Martin Smith, Solicitor to the Inquests, to inform him that, “had there been funding”, counsel would have made submissions to the effect that:

(1) the Inquests should be resumed;
(2) the Inquests should be joined; and
(3) his clients should be made Interested Persons in the Inquests of some of the deceased.
And at point 24:
"i) Effective participation would enable them to discharge their right to put questions and explore issues as an interested party. Additionally their participation may help other parties to explore issues thereby having the potential to produce real benefits for the other Interested Parties;
ii) The proceedings are on any view ‘significant’;
iii) Well-documented campaign to establish the full extent of the knowledge of the security services;
iv) [The claimant] is in a ‘unique position’ as the wife of the alleged ring-leader and her association with the other perpetrators and others. It is difficult to envisage other individuals who could assist the inquest to the same extent;
v) [The claimant] equally anxious to explore the true extent of the knowledge of the Security Services;
vi) Analysis of the intelligence failings may reveal that the atrocity was entirely preventable and the lives of the victims and perpetrators may have been saved;
vii) Volume of material. Extraordinary and unreasonable to expect [the claimant] to deal with by way of legal help; and
viii) No legitimate distinction between those granted funding and [the claimant]"
The families of the 52 expressed their objections to the Inquests to be joined and with regard to the families of the four accused having representation. Although this was their right, the families of the four men also have rights as bereaved family members; these same rights apply equally to the public – and especially the Muslim community, who bear the brunt of anti-terror legislation – to examine the evidence that would need to be presented to the inquests proceedings. This was denied them by the withholding of legal aid for representation – a very blunt and unsubtle tool by which to suppress the right of the families of the accused to legal representation at the Inquests into the 52.

We submit that the arguments forwarded by the families at the judicial review still hold true and that by granting them PIP status at resumed Inquests into the deaths of their loved ones could trigger legal aid being granted by the Legal Services Commission. After all, many public bodies used public funds for representation at these Inquests, the London Fire Brigade, West Yorkshire Police, Metropolitan Police Service, etc. all of whom are funded from the public purse. The public interest argument for these Inquests to be resumed would also be addressed by granting PIP to the families of the four.

It is the lack of challenge or questions that J7 are concerned with and so we ask to be also considered as PIPs in these proceedings, with this submission and our previous works and researches as the justifications for so qualifying. J7 have contacted the office of the Official Solicitor on the basis that, if there is to be no submission for resumption because legal aid has not been made available to any of the families of the four, and nor has PIP status been granted to them, then the State has a duty to represent the interests of Justice by ensuring these Inquests are resumed, and the evidence adduced and questioned accordingly.

Grounds upon which the Inquests must be resumed

(1) As detailed above, J7 are most concerned that the Catch 22 situation of refusing legal aid to allow submissions for resumption of the Inquests into the 4 deaths is being used to prevent the families from asking questions or, potentially even challenging the evidence adduced. This is both unfair and unjust. Justice in this case not only needs to be seen to be done, it must in fact be done.

(2) To date, there have been no proceedings at which the full 'Operation Theseus' evidence has been examined or challenged. The two trials at which this evidence was first submitted for public scrutiny was unable to question or challenge the evidence, the motivation, or the means and methods of the four men, as the accused had no knowledge of these events. Further, and most significantly given the degree with which the State pursued prosecutions against them, Waheed Ali, Sadeer Saleem, and Mohammed Shakil, they were found not guilty, on both separate occasions that the State endeavoured to prosecute them, of all charges connected to the Operation Theseus investigation. Therefore the evidence did not come under the detailed scrutiny required in a criminal trial, as it would have had the alleged perpetrators lived. (q.v. Guildford 4, Birmingham 6, Maguire 7, Danny McNamee, etc.)

(3) We understand and would like to highlight and reiterate that an inquest verdict of suicide requires a criminal standard of proof with regard to establishing definite intent to commit suicide. The representation of the families will be of great assistance to the Inquest's task of determining whether such a verdict is justified. Without a resumption of the Inquests into the four, this finding cannot be legally made.

(4) We understand that the four cannot be named as the perpetrators of the 52 deaths in any narrative verdict available to the Deputy Coroner in these proceedings.

(5) J7 argue that the evidence for the Theseus investigation was considered outside of the scope of these proceedings, yet evidence adduced during these proceedings has shown cause for concern over the accuracy of this evidence. One instance, for example, occurred on 2nd February 2011, while DS Stuart was under questioning from Ms Gallagher QC:
Q. Detective Sergeant, just to clarify it, if we could go back to [INQ105680-12] at paragraph 64 , when, in the opening to the Theseus trial, as was widely reported, it stated there that this information was recovered from that mobile phone found at Edgware Road, is that simply wrong?
A. Yes.
(6) The identification of 'Conspiracy Theories' as one of the raison d'etres for the resumption of the Inquests into the 52 was stated by Hugo Keith QC in his opening statement on 14th October 2011:
12 ….. Thus it is
13 to be hoped that these inquests, however unpleasant and
14 distressing, as they will be, will assist in answering
15 the families' questions in allaying some of the rumours
16 and suspicion generated by conspiracy theorists.
17 I'll return a little later to the question of
18 whether there is, in truth, any basis for some of the
19 theories that have been canvassed in the press and on
20 the internet.
Whilst J7 would take issue with the apparent pejorative use of the term 'conspiracy theorists' given the multiplicity of well documented anomalies, inconsistencies and falsehoods contained in the official narrative (as outlined in our detailed submissions to the Inquests) and the questions that have subsequently arisen from Inquest evidence and testimony, and given the fact that it is, as a point of fact, the State itself that most frequently uses and abuses the charge of 'Conspiracy' in its prosecutions, we are aware that, without resumption of the Inquests into the four, the many further questions regarding the evidence that have arisen during the Inquest proceedings will continue to remain unanswered.
Some of these questions are detailed below:

(i) The Inquests have already heard that a report into the bombings by the parliamentary intelligence and security committee, the only public body to which the security service reports, contained "many many mistakes and inaccuracies" in its account of the intelligence service's conduct before the attacks.

(ii) There is the significant issue of the requirement to prove intent to commit suicide in cases where suicide is suspected. In cases of suspected suicides inquests will be held, but the victim's intention to commit suicide must be definitely proven; here-in lies the burden of proof. In the absence of any clear proof of intent, the verdict is unlikely to be suicide, but rather 'death by misadventure', 'accidental death', or there will be an 'open' verdict. There are in existence two alleged “martyrdom videos”; one of which appears to show Khan and the release of which called an end to all lines of questioning of the official story that were being pursued by the media, and the second, cunningly released on the first anniversary of the 7/7 attacks, appears to show Tanweer. It is worth noting that throughout the contrived and stilted rhetoric in each video, no mention is made by either Khan or Tanweer regarding any intention to commit suicide. Further, there is no mention in either video of any attacks on London, or London's transport infrastructure. Indeed there are no references to the launching of any attacks at all, suicide or otherwise. There has also been no mention at all of Tanweer, Hussain or Lindsay leaving last wills and testaments, despite this being a requirement in Islam. This leaves all four suspected suicides for which the burden of proof of intent to commit suicide has not yet been addressed in anything other than loosely circumstantial way, much less has that standard of proof been met.

(iii) Testimony given by DI Kindness on 14th October 2010 calls into question, once again, aspects of the government narrative and further errors in Theseus evidence:
MS GALLAGHER: You say that you focused upon Luton station as a result of information received on 11 July. Is that right?
A. That's correct, yes.
Q. In that document which I've made reference to, I think you have it before you, my Lady, the Anti-terrorist Branch SO13 record -- do you have that document before you?
A. No, I don't, no.
Q. Is it possible for a copy to be provided?
MR KEITH: You can have my copy. (Handed)
MS GALLAGHER: This is a record of an officer viewing CCTV. It seems to be by a DC Stephen Bain. Was he part of the same team?
A. Yes, he was, yes.
Q. If you just look in the box at the top, it's on the left, five boxes down, "Date viewing commenced: 10 July 2005, 20.00 hours" and "Date viewing ended:11 July 2005, 23.30".
A. Yes.
Q. So is it possible that, in fact, that information was received on 10 July rather than 11 July, Inspector?
A. That's absolutely correct. It's an error. It should have been the 10th.
This evidence was further contradicted by DCS McKenna on the closing day of evidence when he stated:
1 You've already outlined, I think, most of the main
2 threads of investigation that led to us Luton railway
3 station and it's -- it was a fortuitous coincidence
4 that, on the day that we had discovered the CCTV from
5 Luton railway station, we, of course, were assisted by
6 the coming forward of some witnesses from Luton, from
7 whom you have heard, who raised with us the suspicious
8 activity they'd seen in relation to the cars that
9 morning.
In fact the only witness to the cars at Luton that gave evidence was Susan Clarke and she only contacted the police on the morning of 12th July according to her testimony. Ms Gallagher had previously adduced that the viewing logs from Luton station were dated 10th and 11th July.

(iv) The missing CCTV evidence from the day gives cause for concern. No explanation was given for the failure of the CCTV at King's Cross underground station, ticket barriers or platforms, nor CCTV shown of Hasib Hussain's apparent re-entry to the mainline station from the Northern Line platform as asserted in evidence and in the government narrative. There is a major discrepancy between the timings of the CCTV shown from WH Smiths and the time on the receipt of a purchase of a battery. There is also missing CCTV from Woodall Service Station of nearly 15 minutes between exiting and rejoining the motorway. Strange and unexplained cuts in the CCTV shown from Luton Station car park. The removal of the Fiat Brava CCTV was not shown, nor was an explanation given for why Bedfordshire Police requested its removal. No explanation was given for the turning off of CCTV at McDonald's prior to Hasib entering, nor was the time of this incident given. No explanation for the lack of CCTV from the 91 bus was adduced, nor was a reason why this bus halted and emptied its passengers at Euston Station. No CCTV from the trains prior to the explosions was shown, nor was it even claimed to exist, despite a claim by Rachel North regarding a discussion held in May 2006 between survivors and bereaved and the then Home Secretary, John Reid:
The first question was from a man who lost his boyfriend at Russell Square who wanted to know if there were CCTV images of the bombers on the trains, and whether he could see the last minutes of his loved one. The Counter Terrorism representative said that there were, but they had not been released, as the post-bomb CCTV images 'were disturbing'. Dr. Reid promised to investigate whether images of the train before the bomb could be shown privately to the bereaved man. It sounded like the CCTV images were not of good quality.
The public have been shown CCTV evidence from the Operation Vivace (21 July 2005) trial of the men on CCTV from the train carriages which were of good quality, we suggest similar evidence could and should be shown to the Inquests as the presence of those accused of the underground incidents has only been shown as far as King's Cross Thameslink. It should also be able to show the presence of MSK and Tanweer for a considerable length of time on journeys away from King's Cross, and also the entry of three accused onto the carriages from King's Cross.

This lack of evidential continuity between all of the 4 accused and the actual scenes is very concerning. This sentiment was expressed to survivors by 'C', DCI SO15:
One of the many things that police have to prove is the 'evidential continuity' of exhibits, sometimes even from before they become significant as exhibits. This continuity is an issue which is subject of detailed scrutiny in legal proceedings. The whole process is carefully documented, and any break in this documentation immediately devalues the exhibit.
(v) No 'life extinct' pronounced at either Tavistock Square, nor the Piccadilly Line train. The numbers pronounced for life extinct at Aldgate and Edgware Road by Dr Morgan Costello were both one less than would account for the presence of either Mohammed Sidique Khan or Shehzad Tanweer at the respective locations they are alleged to have been at.

(vi) The types of explosives allegedly used differed between Clifford Todd's testimony and the sworn testimony adduced during the Jean Charles de Menezes Inquest. Clifford Todd stated HMTD was found in Alexandra Grove, in the cars, with further traces found at the scenes.
2 A. Well, from just those results, clearly we wouldn't have
3 been able to say that, but the conclusion that it's
4 likely that it was HMTD and hydrogen peroxide and pepper
5 comes from the accumulation of all the other evidence
6 from Alexandra Grove and the various components that
7 were physical items that were actually found from
8 Russell Square and, indeed, the other scenes.
'Codename Neil', the forensics officer at the scene claims TATP was found in both the Micra and Alexandra Grove.
4 them in the car and take them with them. Once again,
15 there was evidence of TATP explosive at the bomb-making
16 factory in Leeds.
and:
23 cable, they found flash bulbs which will be a typical
24 igniter for, as it was, TATP explosives.
DAC McDowall, the gold command for Operation Theseus:
12.... In the bomb factory in Leeds that was
13 discovered, we found TATP literally sprayed around the
14 premises and on the floor. If I can say that that
15 explosive will detonate if trodden on
and:
19 A. That was a distinct possibility, yes, particularly
20 given, perhaps I should amplify, the amount of explosive
21 left behind, if I can use that expression, by the 7 July
22 bombers was of a very great magnitude. Certainly
23 a bathful and more of the main charge, and as I said
24 yesterday, a very substantial quantity of the
25 excessively volatile TATP on 7 July.

157

1 SIR MICHAEL WRIGHT: This was all in the Yorkshire bomb
2 factory, this is what you found and presumably
3 neutralised?
DIC Purser, describes 'brown sludge' as 'not explosives' and only describes this as being only in the bath at Alexandra Grove:
15 Q. Did you go on to tell them that further enquiries had
16 taken you to West Yorkshire, you gave a particular
17 address in Leeds, and you said that that was discovered
18 to be the bomb factory?
19 A. Yes, it was.
20 Q. Did you tell them that examination of that scene was
21 ongoing, but that a brown sludge had been found in the
22 bath? Examination indicated that it was not explosives.
23 Porton Down had indicated that it was not a biological
24 substance but they weren't sure what it was, and had
25 said it might be some kind of insecticide?
J7 can provide many more examples of areas of questioning that a resumed Inquest into the four should examine to ensure that it is possible for a true and accurate account of the events in London on 7th July 2005 to be placed before the public.

For truth and justice

“To the living we owe respect,
but to the dead we owe only the truth.”
- Voltaire

Saturday, 5 February 2011

SIMply wrong

Back in October 2010, when DS Stuart first gave sworn testimony to the 7/7 Inquests (J7 analysis here) he told us that a phone belonging to MSK was found at Edgware Road:
Q. In particular, investigators found in the wreckage a phone subsequently determined to belong to Khan?
A. That's correct, sir, yes.
Q. When that phone was examined, did it have any readable data on it?
A. No, sir, it was damaged beyond --

DS Stuart then discussed the calls made and received on this 'phase 4 operational phone' produced in a schedule entitled 'Draft schedule of all calls between MSK, Tanweer, Hussein and Lindsay attributed phones 270605 - 070705, and all calls in the same period to/from phones used by the four on 070705'.

The details for the phone used by Khan and described as 'a phase 4 operational phone' ends with '254'. Its recovery and connection to Khan was described to Hugo Keith QC by DS Stuart:
A. The handset for that phone was discovered at the Edgware Road scene where Mohammed Sidique Khan's body was recovered. DNA from Mohammed Sidique Khan was recovered from the handset as well. The phone was routinely cell-sited in and around his home address. It was cell-sited in Luton on the 7th where we know from CCTV Mohammed Sidique Khan was. It only ever rang the other three. It was never rung by another number attributed to Mohammed Sidique Khan.

DS Stuart then claims that previous operational phones contained no suspicious contacts, preferring to claim that each of the 4 phase 'operational phones' were only called by the 4 accused in connection to each other, the caveat to that being calls to car hire companies and the 3 men that were tried in the Theseus trial. Answering question from Mr Patterson QC, we gather that:
Q. Have you, Sergeant, analysed the contacts made between the earlier phones and numbers being used by the four men and other people outside that group of four?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did those enquiries lead you to any suspicions as to other contacts that might have led to suggestions that other people were involved or assisting the four men?
A. There have been prior court cases in relation to that, sir, yes.
Q. I'm aware of that, and three individuals in particular, but focusing just on the days leading up to 7/7, any suspicious contacts in any of the telephones in that period of time?
A. No, this is an accurate schedule of that, of all the contacts.
Q. Yes. That's not quite an answer to my question. One issue that arises is whether there's evidence that the four bombers were assisted in any way, either on the 7th itself or in the days leading up, and one way we can analyse that question is by focusing on telephone contact. Any suspicious contacts on the 7th or in the days leading up with others outside of the group of four?
A. No, sir, not that I'm aware of, no, sir.


This point is further confirmed by counsel to the MPS, Max Hill, in his questioning of DS Stuart:
Q. Then just looking at the entirety of this schedule, so the period from 27 June to 7 July, are you saying that this is a complete operational picture in terms of telephones in the hands of all four bombers throughout the period 27 June to 7 July?
A. Operational, yes, sir.
Q. In answer to earlier questions from Mr Patterson, it is right that at an earlier stage there was what might be called some operational telephone use connected to those who became the subject of the Theseus trials.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The three men who stood trial in 2008 and 2009.


To sum up what we knew in October 2010, a single phone, Khan's 'phase 4 operational phone 254', was found at the Edgware Road site, the phone had no recoverable data, the schedule released shows all calls made and received on operational phones between 27/08/05 and 07/07/05. The only suspicious calls made and/or received on operational phones were those connected to the two Theseus trials held in 2008/09.

J7 contacted the Inquests to clarify some of these details when we became aware that DS Stuart would return to give further testimony to the 7/7 Inquests on 2nd February 2011. One of the issues we asked for clarification on was:
During the questioning of Detective Sergeant Mark Stuart, in sworn testimony, he stated that there was no recoverable data from a phone 'determined to belong' to Mohammad Sidique Khan:

However, news articles covering the first and second trials of the accused Waheed Ali, Sadeer Saleem and Mohammed Shakil claim that a phone recovered from Edgware Road contained phone numbers attributable to the accused and a text message sent from Waheed Ali to Khan:

Flewitt said the strength of Ali's relationship to Khan was demonstrated by a text message Ali sent to the July 7 ringleader on December 7 2003.

It read: "Gates of memories I will neva (sic) close. How much I will miss you no one knows. Tears in my eyes will wipe away but the love in my heart for you will always stay."

In the remains of Khan's mobile telephone, recovered from the debris at Edgware Road, were numbers "attributable" to Shakil, saved as "SHAXMOB",and Saleem, saved as "Sads", the jury was told.

Evidence in the trial included details of the remains of Mohammad Sidique Khan's phone, found amid the wreckage of his Edgware Road blast that killed six people. His phone included a number tagged "SHAXMOB", attributable to Mohammed Shakil, and another entry, "SADS", referring to Sadeer Saleem.


He was so close to Khan a text message was found on the suicide bomber's mobile phone in the rubble of the Edgware Road blast. It read: “Gates of memories I will neva (sic) close. How much I miss you no one knows.Tears in my eyes will wipe away, but the love in my heart for you will always stay.”

When DS Stuart's returned to give further evidence on Wednesday 2nd February he was asked the following by Hugo Keith:
Q. May I, before I move away from Khan's operational phones, address one particular point? An organisation that has been following this issue has expressed a certain degree of confusion as to which phones were recovered where, and perhaps I could just clear up that particular confusion, if it exists. In relation to MSK's phone, 826, the handset and SIM were found, were they not, inside the tunnel at Edgware Road?
A. That's correct.
Q. That's the third phone on the page?
A. Yes.
Q. As a result of the SIM card being found, was it possible to retrieve any of the data on that phone?
A. There was no data that could be recovered.
Although it was sent off for examination, they couldn't extract any data for it.
Q. What about in relation to the last operational phone, 254, which was also, I think you told us last year, recovered from Edgware Road --
A. Yes, sir.
Q. -- or at least certainly the handset was recovered and I think you told us that it was damaged beyond repair?
A. It was, sir, and for the same reason, they couldn't extract any data from it either.
Q. Where Khan sent or received texts, therefore, particularly at the time of the use of the last operational phone, how were you able to retrieve data evidencing the sending or receipt of texts?
A. The actual sending would come from the call data. The context or the content, we would rely on downloads for whichever phone it was sent to or received from.
Q. So are there a number of routes by which data can be retrieved, even if you don't have the original SIM card?
A. Yes, sir.

Not only did Keith take this opportunity to claim that not only 'a phone' was found at Edgware Road, as stated by Stuart on 14th October, but in fact, two phones were found in the tunnel. Khan's phase 3 & 4 operational phones, 826 & 254 respectively. Yet it seems that only the handset and not the SIM of the 'phase 4 operational phone', the sole phone described in the schedule discussed when Stuart gave his original testimony, was recovered. No reason is given for Khan's missing SIM card.

Ms Gallagher, counsel for the bereaved, also questions DS Stuart on the question J7 posed in relation to the data extracted from Khan's phone that was referred to in the Theseus trials:
... Could I just start by dealing with this issue of confusion? Mr Keith, when questioning you, referred to an organisation having expressed confusion about your statement on 14 October about there being no readable data from the phone at Edgware Road that was recovered at Edgware Road, and you were taken to those two phones. It's [INQ11176-2]. So both the phone number ending 826 that was recovered inside the tunnel at Edgware Road --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and I think you've said the SIM card was found and sent off but there was no readable data?
A. That's correct, yes.
Q. And phone number 254 also recovered from Edgware Road mentioned at the bottom of that page and you said, for the same reason, no data was recoverable there?
A. The handset was recovered and it was -- no data could be --
Q. Mr Keith said, "Well, how do we have information about the exchange of text messages?", and you made reference to obtaining call data. So it's possible to obtain information about text messages without extracting it from the hardware itself, from the SIM card of the telephone?
A. Yes, there will be a record of the sending of the text on the call data that we can recover from the phone companies.
Q. But Detective Sergeant, that's just information about the sending and receipt of texts. It's not information about the content?
A. The content you would only get if the phone that either received or sent the text to the damaged phone was itself recovered and examined and we could derive data from it.
Q. So the comms data can't give you the content, that's only possible from hardware of one or other phone. So it's not possible to recover information such as contact details, so telephone numbers that are saved and so on, through comms data?
A. No, that's correct.
Q. Detective Sergeant, I think the difficulty is that your answers won't have cleared up the confusion, because the reason that the confusion has arisen is that there were a number of news articles, public at the time of the Theseus trial, which referred to the actual content of text messages recovered from one of those phones and, indeed, I think publicly there's some information with links to those news articles. But, in fact, we can go one step further because, of course, we've got the opening from counsel in the Theseus trial -- the reference is [INQ105680-12]. It's paragraph 64 and it says: "Among the debris at the scene of the Edgware Road bombing the police found part of a mobile telephone belonging to MSK. In the memory of that mobile phone was recorded a mobile telephone number attributable to Shakil ... and a ... number attributable to ...Saleem ..." Then paragraph 65, I don't think we need it on screen, but for your reference, my Lady, that includes the content of a particular text, also recovered from that.

There is then some discussion on how the texts between Lindsay and Khan were recovered and it is established that these were accessed from Lindsay's phone, then continues:
Q. The reason it's important to do this, obviously, is, as you're aware, a number of people are following these proceedings very closely. There's been some concern expressed about this issue, so it seems sensible to just put it to bed. If there's a simple answer, let's just have it and it will be on the public record.
A. Yes, not at all. [ibid p35:5 on]
-------------
Q. Detective Sergeant, just to clarify it, if we could go back to [INQ105680-12] at paragraph 64 , when, in the opening to the Theseus trial, as was widely reported, it stated there that this information was recovered from that mobile phone found at Edgware Road, is that simply wrong?
A. Yes. [ibid p39:22 on]

Simply wrong? We can add this 'simply wrong' to the litany of errors anomalies and inconsistencies that J7 have detailed, so far, over the 15 weeks of the 7/7 Inquests. The fact that 'simply wrong' evidence can be used in an attempt to convict 3 men, all found innocent, who faced up to 40 years in prison isn't just 'simply wrong' it's 'simply appalling'.

More 'simply wrong'

The first page of a schedule detailing purchases from hydroponics shops was released, beginning on 22nd February 2005, claiming that Tanweer contacted Huddersfield Hydroponics on a phone 'atributed to him' which was cell sited within a 2km radius. Keith claims that 'operational phone usage begins around the time that hydrogen peroxide purchases are made'. [ibid p15:9 on] Yet DS Stuart gives the precise date and time for the first use of an operational phone (phase 1) for Tanweer as 25 March at 18.06, over a month after the supposed first purchase of hydrogen peroxide [ibid p11:14 on]. Simply wrong.

Pakistan calling

After claiming that no 'suspicious calls' were made to or from operational phones in DS Stuart's original testimony, the updated schedules show calls made to Khan's 'operational phones' from various phone kiosks in Pakistan, mainly from the Rawalpindi district. 'No suspicious calls' (simply wrong?) transforms into 'so many suspicious calls':
.. question of calls from Pakistan, if we just screen down, please, to page 11 [INQ11177-11] of the exhibit, we can see in the bottom half of the page there a number of calls from Pakistan?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In particular from Rawalpindi, so 9 May, 10 May. Over the page to 12 May, page 12 [INQ11177-12] of the document. Then moving forward to 14 May on page 14 [INQ11177-14] , there were a great deal many calls from Rawalpindi on that day, we can see there, all to MSK, the original schedule is in red, and I needn't go through the schedule to the later dates, but are there further calls on 19 May, 31 May and 2 June?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. There appeared to be a substantial number of calls in that period from the middle of May to the beginning of June, and then, again, were there further calls from Pakistan, right at the very end, just a matter of days before the bombs are detonated on 7 July, on 2 July in fact?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you assess that these calls, therefore, were probably connected to some guidance or some means of communicating information concerned with the manufacture of the bombs and then, ultimately, their detonation?
A. Yes, I think they had to be, sir. [ibid p20:1 on]
Not just suspicious calls but apparently 'bomb-making suspicious calls' - did DS Stuart think these unworthy of mention during his first appearance at the 7/7 Inquests? Perhaps the testimony given by Clifford Todd, principal forensic investigator at the Forensic Explosives Laboratory the previous day, contains the reason:
Q. The technical expertise required to construct either the initiating device or the main explosive device, was that of a particularly high order, or could those four men -- none of whom it seems had any particular skills in chemistry -- have carried that out under a certain degree of guidance or instruction themselves?
A. Yes, they would have needed some -- certainly initial guidance or instruction, I believe. I don't think that -- my comment about them dealing with this and doing this in isolation is intended to make a distinction between four people with no experience of bomb-making, suddenly between themselves, and only between themselves, deciding to come up with a bomb plot such as this, make the devices, and go and set them off, certainly without extensive practice themselves. That's not really feasible. They would need some detailed instruction and some practice, almost certainly, at doing this. So that's what I was trying to get at in my comment about having some outside help. There must have been something more, some -- they must, at some point, have had some advice.
Q. Once the instructions or the guidance had been provided, and perhaps alongside a certain degree of training, perhaps abroad, would they have required there to have been a specialist bomb-maker or a chemist present in Alexandra Grove for bringing their plot to fruition?
A. No. I should also perhaps say that these were -- these devices were entirely unique. Certainly the hydrogen peroxide mixed with a fuel such as pepper were entirely unique within the UK for sure and, as far as I know, worldwide as well. At the time, there would have been plenty of information on the internet about how to make bombs of various descriptions, and certainly now, if you were to look, probably you will find information about devices of this particular type. But at that time, if it was the case that four people just decided to do this with no prior experience, they probably could have got enough information off the internet, but it would be extremely unlikely they would have come up with this particular design. They would have most likely come up with a design already known and spoken about on the internet, which, to the best of my knowledge, that wasn't there at that time.
Q. So this supports your overall view that the construction of these devices could only have been undertaken with guidance and instruction from elsewhere --
A. Yes, correct.

Q. -- and obviously persons unknown. The process is not, regrettably, hugely complex, but it is quite a sensitive process, is it not, in terms of getting the ratios and the mixtures right?
A. Yes.
Q. Is it your view that the paraphernalia in Alexandra Grove indicate that a great deal, unfortunately, of time and effort appears to have been dedicated to getting the ratios right and to making these devices work?
A. Yes, both the time and effort has been taken and the understanding there of what they need to do to get it right.

The 'suspicious Pakistan phone calls' may go some way to answer Clifford Todd's amazement that the 4 accused were able to construct viable devices, of the like never seen before or since, without considerable expertise. What it doesn't answer is: How did they know which of the devices were viable and which were 'simply wrong'?


J7 will return to analysing the vast amount of evidence released over the last week in relation to Alexandra Grove and bomb making. In the meantime..

As Hugo Keith and Ms Gallagher correctly described J7, we are an organisation that is keeping a close eye on these proceedings. In the absence of a jury to ask questions, to note the many inconsistencies, it is up to we the ordinary people who are not following these proceedings for catchy headlines to sell newspapers, to examine the evidence presented to the 7/7 Inquests and ensure that we are all informed when this evidence is 'simply wrong'.

Monday, 22 November 2010

The Conspirators and the "Conspiracy Phones"

This previous post raises an interesting question regarding quite how the four accused men had avoided detection to such an extent that the security services had no idea of their alleged plans. What with travel tickets, handwritten documents laying their plans bare and receipts recovered both from the homes of the accused and the Alexandra Grove 'bomb factory', their behaviour suggests that these men were not in the least bit concerned about their alleged plans being discovered yet the narrative tells us 'Khan was worried about being under surveillance during this time.

'This time' plainly refers to the supposed planning of the events of 7/7, since just above this statement, it is also written,
Other things suggest discipline and meticulous planning with good security awareness including careful use of mobile phones and use of hire cars for sensitive activities associated with the planning of the attacks.

The 'careful use of the mobile phones' was explored on the 4th day of the inquests during the testimony of DS Mark Stuart of Counter-terrorism command. DS Stuart confirmed that 'a certain number' of phones were recovered. What we also discover from DS Stuart, is that the police referred to the phones the accused men were using that day as 'operational phones' (as opposed to their personal phones) - which Mr. Hugo Keith QC later interchanges with the intriguing term 'conspiracy phones'.

These phones are claimed by DS Stuart to have been a way to 'avoid detection' by being changed on several occasions:
A. [DS Stuart] There were a series of operational phones. The earliest operational phones began in May, the middle of May, 2005, sir.
Q. [Hugo Keith QC] How many times were the phones switched or how many times were a new set of operational phones introduced into their usage?
A. For three of the subjects, four times, you're looking at data for the last, fourth, operational phone. For Lindsay, there were three, sir.
DS Stuart confirms later in the proceedings that the total number of 'conspiracy' phones used by the men was 15. One could argue that if a phone is changed four times, as three of the men are alleged to have done, this equates to five phones in total each - meaning that with Lindsay's four phones, the total amount of changes stated equates to 19 phones. This may seem a trivial point, but it is indicative of the confusing nature of DS Stuart's testimony. Another example of this is his account of the recovery of Khan's 'conspiracy' phone:
Q. In particular, investigators found in the wreckage a phone subsequently determined to belong to Khan?
A. That's correct, sir, yes.
Q. When that phone was examined, did it have any readable data on it?
A. No, sir, it was damaged beyond --
Q. Officer, could I ask you to keep your voice up a bit?
A. Sorry. No, it was too damaged to recover data from.
Q. So when that phone was examined, it wasn't possible to extract any relevant information from it?
A. No, sir.
Q. Was there also recovered from the Russell Square tunnel a phone subsequently determined to belong to Lindsay?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When that phone was recovered, was it found to have information on it?
A. It was, sir, yes.

So very early on, we find that no data could be extracted from Khan's phone, which was recovered from the Edgware Road site, due to the damage it sustained. The implication thereafter is that the only way any data relating to Khan can be examined is through looking at incoming calls or texts on the other phones recovered from the day, in particular, the phone attributed to Lindsay, from which information had been extracted. However, a little later in his testimony, DS Stuart seems to contradict his earlier statement:
Q. Could I just run very briefly through why you are so sure that these phones relate to these people? In relation to Khan and his operational phone ending 254, were there a number of pieces of evidence which demonstrated that that phone was indeed his?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Could you very briefly, please, summarise why that conclusion was reached?
A. The handset for that phone was discovered at the Edgware Road scene where Mohammed Sidique Khan's body was recovered. DNA from Mohammed Sidique Khan was recovered from the handset as well. The phone was routinely cell-sited in and around his home address. It was cell-sited in Luton on the 7th where we know from CCTV Mohammed Sidique Khan was. It only ever rang the other three. It was never rung by another number attributed to Mohammed Sidique Khan. That was the principal evidence, sir.

How could this data regarding Khan's phone be known if it wasn't extracted from the phone which DS Stuart had earlier stated 'was too damaged to extract data from'? DS Stuart does not enlighten us to any alternative method used to gain access to the phone's data.

Curiously, DS Stuart never states whether or not Shehzad Tanweer's phone was also recovered in the same way as the other three, at the scene of the explosion at Aldgate. We should note claims by both the narrative and Hugo Keith QC in his opening speech to the Inquests, that Tanweer had lost his mobile phone on the evening of 6th July, during a game of cricket.

However, DS Stuart confirms that a call was made at 00.03.59 on July 7th 2005, from Khan to Tanweer. If Khan's phone is too damaged, then we must assume that this particular data came from Tanweer's phone. But Tanweer lost his phone on the evening of July 6th ; we cannot know if it was his personal or 'conspiracy' phone, we cannot know if he or someone else - found it, and cannot know if a phone attributed to him was found at Aldgate. We further cannot know from which phone this information was extracted as we are not privy to the contact schedule cited by DS Stuart.

When explaining how the 'operational' number for Tanweer was attributed to him, DS Stuart tells Mr. Keith:
This was a number which was provided by Shehzad Tanweer on the rental agreement for the Nissan Micra subsequently left at Luton train station. Again, it was only rung by the other three and not by Tanweer himself. Generally cell-sited in the area of his home address.

So in contrast to the identification of the other three phones, which occurred due to their being recovered from the respective blast sites, Tanweer's 'conspiracy' phone number is identified because he provided it to the car hire company which supplied the Nissan Micra. Why should this be?

The car hire company provides another example of contradicting the idea that attempts were made by the men to avoid detection; Tanweer provided the First 24-Hour Car Rentals Limited with his family home address, confirmed in the statement of an employee of the company who called round to the Tanweer home when the car had not been returned as agreed.
By today, Tuesday, 12th, I was very concerned at the whereabouts. I decided to visit his home address and I went to the vicinity of the address and I saw a police cordon. Having explained why I was there I then provided the rental agreement.

In another statement, it is revealed to the Inquests that another First 24-Hour Car Rentals employee had attempted to contact Tanweer on 7th July, despite the fact that his rental agreement was until 8th July. Why would the car hire company attempt to contact Tanweer the day before he was due to return the car? Again, this is not revealed. The statement from the car hire company contradicts Hugo Keith's claim that they rang Tanweer's phone on 7 July, although the unreleased schedule showed this call:
[First 24-Hour Car Rentals] "Following 8 July, when the vehicle had not been returned as agreed, I rang the mobile number given by him on at least two occasions. However, the phone was off. I can only say, if I saw the man again, I would definitely recognise him."
[Hugo Keith] My Lady, we know that the last entry on the schedule prepared by Mr Stuart at your direction is that there was a call on 7 July, in fact, two minutes to 3 from First 24-hour Car Rentals to Tanweer's number.

Neither was the cell siting for Tanweer's mobile phone disclosed, which would have identified whether this phone was at Aldgate or, if lost, at least identified the location.

DS Stuart had also disclosed that the contact schedule only relates to calls made from 27 June 2005 onwards:
Q. Notwithstanding the fact that there were many thousands of calls made to and from any number of potentially relevant phone numbers, you prepared a schedule showing all the calls between the four men from 27 June onwards?
A. That's correct, sir, yes.
Q. In essence, the most relevant days leading up to the events of 7 July?
A. Yes, sir.

It isn't stated at which point the accused are supposed to have switched to their final set of 'conspiracy phones'; only that this occurred in the last few days before 7/7. Later in the proceedings, Ms. Caoilfhionn Gallagher, representing bereaved families, pushes for analysis of all the 'conspiracy' phones. DS Stuart may yet be called back to give further testimony on these, and we may yet receive clarification regarding how (or even if) Tanweer's phone was recovered.

Germaine Lindsay was said to have purchased and originally registered the phones, then transferred them to each of the others at a later time. DS Stuart makes it clear in his answers that although there was 'some slight mixing' in the use of the 'operational' phones, in that personal phones may have been used to ring an 'operational' phone number, by the time the accused were using their final set of phones, they were used solely for 'operational' purposes or calls to service providers.

Again, the implication is that this, along with clarification by DS Stuart that the use of the phones showed that the men were taking care over communications by buying prepaid unregistered phones and changing them regularly. Yet strangely, the behaviour of Hasib Hussain regarding his phone contradicts this assertion. Having earlier described how the top-up card for his 'operational phone' was found at his home address and the SIM card holder in a bag upon which Hussain's fingerprints were found, under questioning by Max Hill QC, DS Stuart details how the police knew about Hussain's personal phone:
Q. Secondly, in relation to Hasib Hussain, you analysed data relating to mobile number ********805, and two points again in relation to that. Firstly, that number was not used by Hussain on 7 July?
A. No, sir.
Q. But, secondly, through analysis of items recovered, including a SIM card, a mobile phone SIM card, found at Tavistock Square where Hussain's body was found, a download -- in other words, interrogation of the information held within that SIM card -- showed the 805 number saved within the SIM card under the title "My number"?
A. Yes, I believe that's the case.
Q. That goes towards attribution of that as a personal phone for Hussain, but one that you can say was not used on 7 July?
A. Correct, sir, yes.

If Hasib Hussain was only using this phone in the 'last few days' leading up to 7th July, then why take the trouble to program in his own personal number? Why would someone trying to 'avoid detection' do this anyway? Moreover, Hussain's personal phone was found by his brother, Imran, to contain not only Lindsay's number, but that of the keyholder for 18 Alexandra Grove, Dr Shakir Al Ani. Why program these numbers into his personal phone, if he was also in possession, at various times, of four (or more) 'conspiracy' phones. When asked by Lady Justice Hallet how the police were able to distinguish between the personal phones belonging to each men and the 'conspiracy' phones, in terms of usage, DS Stuart responds:
There was a distinct difference between the usage of the two types of phone. The personal phones all appeared to be unrelated, a lot of different people rung by them, but the enquiry showed that they were people that were known, historical friends and family. So that's why I can't remember there being anything which jumps out as being operational from a non-operational phone, my Lady.

If this is the case, why did Hussain have the 'operational' numbers found on his 'non-operational' phone by his brother, which in turn, according to the Daily Mirror, led him straight to the Alexandra Grove 'bomb factory' If Hussain was seriously trying to cover his tracks, he had made a pretty poor fist of it.

In summary, we've learned the following from DS Stuart's testimony regarding what Hugo Keith prefers to call the 'conspiracy' phones:
  • Khan's 'conspiracy' phone was too damaged to extract data from, yet counter-terrorism investigators appeared to have managed to do just that.
  • We do not know whether Tanweer had a 'conspiracy' phone with him on July 7th, because although DS Stuart mentioned calls being made from other phones to the phone attributed to Tanweer, he never mentions calls being made from that phone, nor does he mention that his phone was found at the Aldgate scene in the same way that the phones attributed to the three other men were found at the other blast sites.
  • We know that Tanweer lost his phone on 6 July but we do not know whether this was his personal phone or 'conspiracy' phone, or whether he found it before the next day. The cell siting of the car hire company call on either the 7 July according to the schedule or the 8 July according to the car hire company, would reveal the location of this phone but was not disclosed to the Inquest.
  • The four accused were trying to avoid detection to such an extent that they routinely left incriminating evidence, either in their own homes or the Alexandra Grove flat, provided a genuine address even when using a 'conspiracy' phone to arrange car hire and Hussain in particular, found a way of leading detectives straight to his personal number from his 'conspiracy' phone.
  • There may have been 15 or 19 'conspiracy' phones in total, but we have only been provided with testimony with the final 4 phones used. We were not allowed to see the contact schedule; this was "not for publication".
  • DS Stuart defines the "trade craft" use of the "conspiracy phones" thus: "Taking care over your communications, buying prepaid unregistered phones, changing them regularly to avoid detection ultimately" yet later states that Tanweer's phone, at least, was purchased, and registered, by Lindsay using a false name. Why would Lindsay go to the trouble of registering the phone at all, when an unregistered phone could so easily be purchased with a pre-paid SIM?